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Trademark Cosmopolitanism 
Sonia K. Katyal* 
The world of global trademarks can be characterized in terms of three 
major shifts: first, a shift from national to global branding strategies; 
second, a shift from national and regional systems to harmonized 
international regimes governing trademark law; and third, a concurrent 
shift from local to transnational social movements that challenge branding 
and other corporate practices. This Article details how each of these areas 
are deeply intertwined with one another, and also how the emergence of a 
transnational trademark regime carries important implications for 
freedom of expression worldwide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2008, Nadia Plesner, a Danish art student, decided to do 
something about the lingering crisis in Darfur. She designed a T-shirt 
to raise money for the cause, depicting a starving Sudanese child 
holding a Chihuahua in one hand and a Louis Vuitton bag in the other 
— in a classic appropriation of a famous photograph depicting Paris 
Hilton in a bikini. “I started this campaign because of the distorted 
way the media prioritizes between big and small world news,” she 
explained. “How can Paris Hilton make more front covers than the 
genocide in Darfur?”1 Shortly thereafter, she was served with a harshly 
written letter from the Intellectual Property Director for Louis Vuitton 
(“LVMH”) that read, in part: 
Although we applaud your efforts to raise awareness and funds 
to help Darfur, a most worthy cause, we cannot help noticing 
that the design . . . includes the reproduction of a bag 
infringing on Louis Vuitton’s Intellectual Property Rights, in 
particular the Louis Vuitton Monogram Multicolore 
Trademark to which it is confusingly similar. We are surprised 
of such a promotion of a counterfeit bag. 
LVMH did not mince its words. The letter goes on to request that 
Plesner discontinue distributing the shirt immediately.2 
Plesner eventually replied, explaining to LVMH’s lawyer that she did 
not use an exact replica of the bag, but rather meant for her depiction 
to simply evoke designer bags in general.3 Nevertheless, LVMH 
decided to file suit against her, threatening thousands of dollars in 
damages.4 Shortly thereafter, the news quickly began to travel 
 
 1 Ernesto, Louis Vuitton Sues Darfur Fundraiser for Copyright Infringement, 
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 25, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/louis-vuitton-sues-darfur-
fundraiser-for-copyright-infringement-080425 (quoting Nadia Plesner); see also 
Jeremiah Owyang, Louis Vuitton Gets Brand-Jacked, Collateral Damage in Anti-Genocide 
Campaign, WEB-STRATEGIST BLOG (May 4, 2008), http://www.web-strategist.com/ 
blog/2008/05/04/louis-vuitton-gets-brand-jacked-victimized-in-anti-genocide-campaign-
tough-spot-to-be-in (quoting Nadia Plesner) (“I felt horrified by the fact that even with 
the genocide and other ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Paris Hilton was the one getting all 
the attention.”). 
 2 Letter from Nathalie Moullé-Berteaux, Intellectual Property Director, Louis 
Vuitton Malletier, to Nadia Plesner (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.clancco. 
com/LouisVuittonLetter.pdf.  
 3 See Ernesto, supra note 1 (“Sometimes recognizable objects are needed to 
express deeper meanings, and in their new form they become more than the objects 
themselves, they become art,” Plesner explained, noting that she planned to “stand by 
my freedom of expression — artistic and/or otherwise,” and continue distribution). 
 4 LVMH demanded $7,500 for each day she continued to sell the product, 
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worldwide. Speaking to New York Magazine, Plesner argued that “[i]f I 
was making bags and copying the design, I would understand the 
problem,” but since she was caricaturing it instead in a picture, she 
considered it part and parcel of her artistic freedom.5 Roughly six 
months later, and after a major maelstrom in the media, the case 
finally settled for an undisclosed amount, and Plesner no longer 
distributes the shirt as a result. 
The resolution of the case might have ended the standoff between 
LVMH and Plesner, but only for the moment. Interestingly, a year or 
so after the settlement, Plesner decided to reuse the very same image 
in a large piece of visual art called Darfurnica, a piece modeled after 
Picasso’s Guernica (a famous 1937 piece protesting the bombing of the 
town with the same name). Plesner juxtaposed the image with a 
variety of global brands, political symbols, and other elements from 
high fashion. Plesner explained that she decided to name the painting 
after Picasso’ famous work after she discovered that Guernica was 
shrouded in blue cloth during a United Nations press conference on 
the war in Iraq in 2003. For her, Guernica represented the power of 
visual art to make connections between current political events and 
issues of social justice.6 
Plesner’s own work draws obvious parallels between the power of 
political symbols, fashion symbols, and corporate symbols, noting how 
each one occupies a tremendous amount of prominence in our visual 
culture. Indeed, there is a triadic convergence of function between all 
three categories of symbols, because each type can personify both the 
brand creator as well as the audience that consumes them. Each of 
these audiences — whether consumers of luxury goods, political 
actors, or artist/activists like Nadia Plesner — oppositional or 
otherwise, all integrate and respond to particular brands as part of 
their process of self-expression. 
 
another $7,500 for each day she posted its cease-and-desist letter on her site, another 
$7,500 per day for each time she used the name “Louis Vuitton” on her website 
(totaling over $20,000 per day), and finally, another $15,000 to cover their legal and 
related expenses relating to the suit. See id. 
 5 See The Cut, Art Student Nadia Plesner’s Giant Louis Vuitton Copyright Suit, N.Y. 
MAG. (May 6, 2008), http://nymag.com/daily/fashion/2008/05/art_student_nadia_ 
pelsners_gia.html.  
 6 See Nadia Plesner, Darfurnica Day 18 (July 27, 2009), http://www.nadiaplesner. 
com/the-making-of-darfurnica (“It is amazing that an art work can be considered so 
powerful, that it has to be covered up while governments present their plans. It only 
proves that artists around the world must continue to work with the harsh issues to 
influence the people with power and to start important debates.”).  
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Further, as this story demonstrates, the relationships between 
luxury brands, artistic expression, and global politics are constantly 
shifting and in flux. The transnational nature of social movements and 
global branding strategies have evoked significant questions about the 
proper role of intellectual property law, sovereignty, and speech 
within each sphere. Whereas earlier discussions of international social 
justice issues (like the crisis in Darfur) might have been restricted to 
human rights law or other forms of public international law, today’s 
movements now unfold within the structures of the increasing 
globalization of intellectual property law, as well. In other words, 
private law — or specifically, trademark law — is now emerging to 
play a role in international social justice disputes alongside these 
longstanding public law approaches. 
We have long been aware of the magnetic pull of global brands 
across the world. But what is also remarkable is how powerful that 
pull has become, even to those who oppose their prominence. As 
Plesner’s case demonstrates, global luxury brands have become not 
just the lingua franca of transnational consumption, but also of the 
antibranding activists who resist it. Particularly when luxury brands 
acquire a level of global prominence in public culture, as LVMH has 
done, it is inevitable that its iconic imagery becomes even more 
susceptible to recoding and commentary. The more LVMH has 
invested in its brand, making it more and more ubiquitous in 
consumer culture, it becomes more and more vulnerable as a result, 
leading many individuals to use their brands and logos as a means of 
expressing their own identity or as a vehicle for commenting on 
consumerism, luxury, or branding in general. As a result, LVMH’s logo 
is not just a logo; precisely because of its ubiquity, it now stands for 
something else — luxury, elite excess, celebrity culture, and the like. 
As Plesner’s case demonstrates, activists may seek to recode a brand 
for purposes that have little to do with LVMH’s brand specifically. Yet 
in each of these cases, property principles and freedom of speech 
collide, with luxury brands as the backdrop, producing an impasse 
with variable and unpredictable results. 
Clearly, unauthorized uses pose serious legal and ethical questions 
for global brand owners. Today, LVMH is one of the world’s most 
valuable global brands.7 Like many luxury brands, LVMH, when faced 
 
 7 See MILLWARD BROWN, BRANDZ TOP 100 MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS 2013, at 
25 (2013), available at http://www.millwardbrown.com/brandz/2013/Top100/Docs/ 
2013_BrandZ_Top100_Report.pdf; see also Andrew Roberts, Louis Vuitton Tops 
Hermes as World’s Most Valuable Luxury Brand, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2012, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-21/louis-vuitton-tops-hermes-as-world-s-
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with examples of unauthorized use, has a choice to make: it can either 
tolerate alternative commentary, or it can choose to threaten litigation 
over the unauthorized use of its trademarks. Either choice carries 
consequences, both positive and negative, but each decision that 
LVMH faces underscores how much our world has changed in the last 
several decades regarding the rise and prominence of global branding. 
Today, there are a multitude of what I call transnational brands: 
brands that began with national origins, but which have become global 
icons in the process.8 
The rise of transnational brands brings with it an attendant series of 
legal shifts in trademark law. Long considered the stepchild of 
intellectual property law, today, trademark law has morphed into a 
powerful global legal phenomenon, revealing a foundational shift from 
national and regional systems to harmonized international regimes 
governing trademark law. A unitary system of trademark registration 
is emerging. However, even if a system of harmonized registration 
becomes the new normal, territorial systems of trademark enforcement 
— not to mention constitutional protections for freedom of expression 
— vary widely. Here, age-old questions regarding sovereignty, human 
rights, and artistic freedom have also begun to play a role in modern 
trademark disputes, both domestically and internationally. Yet as the 
Plesner case clearly demonstrates, as brands become global, 
transnational entities, they also engender modes of resistance from a 
number of different social movements. These movements, it seems, are 
just as transnational as the global branding strategies that are often 
their targets, demonstrating how questions of freedom of expression 
emerge alongside the circulation of transnational brands. 
This Article details how each of these areas are deeply intertwined 
with one another, and how they demonstrate the emergence of a broad 
phenomenon that I call trademark cosmopolitanism, which carries 
important implications for freedom of expression worldwide. In this 
Article, I refer to the phenomenon of trademark cosmopolitanism to 
broadly sketch out four trajectories of transnational activities, and 
their relationships to the various entities that play key roles in the 
global branding enterprise — namely, the consumer, the corporation, 
 
most-valuable-luxury-brand.html (stating Louis Vuitton remained the world’s most 
valuable luxury brand for the seventh consecutive year).  
 8 For example, brands such as Nike, Apple, Ralph Lauren, and Honda started off 
nationally before becoming global icons. See generally Mark K. Smith & Michele Erina 
Doyle, Globalization: Theory and Experience, INFED, http://infed.org/mobi/globalization-
theory-and-experience/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (arguing that the growth and 
globalization of multinational corporations is intertwined with branding power). 
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the politician, and the activist. The first set of activities involves what I 
call consumptive cosmopolitanism, and that refers to the purchasing 
and shopping practices of the global consumer and the ways in which 
these practices reflect a kind of globalized consciousness. The second 
set of activities, which are closely related to the first set, involves the 
emergence of a corporately-oriented cosmopolitanism that stems from 
the global corporate social responsibility movement. The third kind of 
activity, which reflects a more macroeconomic set of considerations, 
involves the emergence of an institutionalized form of 
cosmopolitanism, which refers to the variety of government and 
nongovernment entities that have emerged to facilitate the creation, 
enforcement, and protection of transnational brands. The final set of 
transnational activities, however, typify a more politicized form of 
trademark cosmopolitanism that focuses on challenging, rather than 
consuming, the power of branding and multinational corporations. 
All of these trajectories, I would argue, demonstrate broad and 
varied facets of a phenomenon I call trademark cosmopolitanism — 
underscoring the globalization of trademark law. This Article has three 
sections. In Part I, I describe the first three trajectories of trademark 
cosmopolitanism, and discuss the emergence of brands as global, 
transnational figures of both speech, property, and increasingly, 
corporate ethics. In Part II, I turn to the last trajectory and discuss 
how the rise of trademark cosmopolitanism also relates to the global 
antibranding movement, typified by the Plesner example. The 
interplay between the global brand, the global antibrand, and the 
language of ethics, cosmopolitanism, and corporate social 
responsibility, with all of the legal differences associated with 
sovereignty and speech, I would suggest, is one of the paramount 
issues for trademark scholars in the future. 
I. THE RISE OF TRADEMARK COSMOPOLITANISM 
In 1992, Jeremy Waldron published an article, Minority Cultures and 
the Cosmopolitan Alternative, which described the emergence of 
individuals who prefer that their cultural identities not be tied 
specifically to a set of rigidly defined borders.9 Two years later, Martha 
Nussbaum published a groundbreaking essay, Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism, where she argued in favor of a kind of moral 
 
 9 See, Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 751, 754 (1991–1992) (developing the idea of “cosmopolitan” 
individuals who do not self-identify based upon their location, ancestry, citizenship, 
or language).  
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universalism and the need for a cosmopolitan education that 
recognized that central features of human personhood transcended 
national boundaries.10 At the same time, however, she also embraced a 
more robust notion of empathy. “By looking at ourselves in the lens of 
the other,” she wrote, “we come to see what in our practices is local 
and non-necessary, what more broadly or deeply shared.”11 
Those words were written almost twenty years ago, where 
Nussbaum described cosmopolitanism’s roots as linked to Diogenes, 
the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher, who once proclaimed himself as 
“a citizen of the world,” in response to a question about his geographic 
origin.12 In a sense, as Nussbaum explained, Diogenes meant that he 
eschewed a sense of identity that was defined solely by his local 
origins and memberships, that instead, his identity was defined by 
more universal aspirations. Much of this early view was later 
developed by the Stoics, who viewed everyone as belonging to a world 
community of humankind that was joined by basic ethical values and 
principles, like justice, dignity, and respect.13 As Nussbaum observed, 
through these globalized lenses, “[w]e recognize moral obligations to 
the rest of the world that are real, and that otherwise would go 
unrecognized.”14 At the same time, however, Nussbaum did not totally 
 
 10 See Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1, 1994), 
http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism [hereinafter 
Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism] (arguing that moral ideals of justice and equality are 
better accomplished by a primary allegiance “to the community of human beings in the 
entire world” than by a goal of national unity); see also COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND 
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 2 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
COSMOPOLITICS]; DEREK HEATER, WORLD CITIZENSHIP: COSMOPOLITAN THINKING AND ITS 
OPPONENTS 54 (Bloomsbury Academic 2004); Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan 
Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 623 (1997); David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the 
Banality of Geographical Evils, 12 PUB. CULTURE 529, 529-30 (2000); Martha Nussbaum, 
Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 1-4 (1997) [hereinafter Kant and Stoic 
Cosmopolitanism]. See generally DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM 
THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995) (discussing Kant’s 
interpretation of Democratic Cosmopolitanism); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM ET AL., FOR LOVE 
OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 21-29 (J. Cohen ed., 1996) (providing 
multisided discussions of the interaction between patriotism and cosmopolitanism); 
Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitan, 104 ETHICS 516 (1994) (arguing the possibility 
and ease of being both a citizen of a particular nation and a citizen of the world at once).  
 11 Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10.  
 12 See Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10, at 5.  
 13 Id. at 7-12. 
 14 See, e.g., Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10 (“If we 
really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain 
inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception 
requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.”).  
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eschew the pull of localized loyalties; she notes that even within this 
approach, there was still room for patriotism, for localized 
attachments and identities formed from a specific geographic origin.15 
Similar observations have been made by Stuart Hall,16 anthropologist 
Craig Calhoun,17 and others, all of whom embrace the notion of an 
emergent global citizenry, a kind of transnational consciousness that 
spanned borders and cultures and celebrated openness and 
solidarity.18 Many have described cosmopolitanism as having 
essentially two strands — one about culture and the self, and another 
about justice — rejecting a kind of relativism that strict nationalism 
might embrace.19 Others describe it along the lines of a political or 
 
 15 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1032 (2007) 
(asserting Nussbaum insisted on a “cosmopolitanism with room for local, ‘patriotic’ 
attachments”). Similarly, Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his book on cosmopolitanism, 
also applauds a view that focuses on ethical obligations to others, one that also 
embraces a highly robust view of autonomy, but also espouses a similar kind of 
partiality — what Appiah calls “rooted cosmopolitanism” — the idea that one can be 
partial to one’s ethical community. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: 
ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS 213, 223-32 (2007); Appiah, supra note 10, at 618; 
see also Feldman, supra, at 1043 (discussing both Nussbaum and Appiah).  
 16 See Stuart Hall, Political Belonging in a World of Multiple Identities, in 
CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE 25, 26 (Steven 
Vertovec & Robin Cohen eds., 2002) (defining cosmopolitanism as “the ability to 
stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community”); see 
also SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 35, 40 (2005).  
 17 See Craig Calhoun, The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a 
Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM: 
THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 86, 102-09 (linking 
cosmopolitanism to the spread of democracy); see also TARROW, supra note 16, at 40.  
 18 Des Gasper, Cosmopolitan Presumptions? On Martha Nussbaum and Her 
Commentators, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 1227, 1230 (2006).  
 19 See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 49 
(1992) (distinguishing between legal and moral cosmopolitanism); Samuel Scheffler, 
Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, 11 UTILITAS 255 (1999) (outlining two views of 
cosmopolitanism); see also David A. Hollinger, Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The 
New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way, 8 CONSTELLATIONS 236, 236-38 (2002) 
[hereinafter Not Universalists]. See generally SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER 
COSMOPOLITANISM (Robert Post ed., 2006) (noting a transition from international to 
cosmopolitan formations of justice); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, 
RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS (2004) (examining the incorporation of aliens, immigrants, 
and refugees in light of Kantian cosmopolitanism); PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT’S 
COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997) 
(examining a tension between Kantian cosmopolitanism and nationalism that has 
remained constant throughout the last 200 years); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING 
RAWLS (1989) (asserting that Rawl’s critics fail to distinguish between morality and 
justice); THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF COSMOPOLITANISM (Gillian Brock & Harry 
Brighouse eds., 2005) (containing works by political theorists in defense of positive 
cosmopolitanism as opposed to rigid support for national boundaries); KOK-CHOR 
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institutional formulation — focusing on the emergence of globalized 
institutions.20 
Of course, much ink can be spilled about the importance of 
cosmopolitanism on political and legal theory. For the purposes of this 
Article, however, I want to briefly sketch out some of the ways in 
which dominant approaches to the study of both cosmopolitanism and 
transnationalism reveal new ways of situating our increasingly 
globalized systems of trademark regulation, and the ancillary ethical 
and moral questions that inevitably accompany this growth. 
On a primary level, I would argue that Nussbaum and the current 
scholarship on cosmopolitanism have much to offer intellectual 
property scholars, many of whom are grounded in territorial 
frameworks that often fail to reckon with the erosion of sovereignty, 
the rise of global branding, and the ancillary rise of trademark 
harmonization in our current legal context. Currently, the field of 
trademark doctrine often remains closely tied to principles of 
territoriality and localized principles, despite the widespread embrace 
of transnational forces.21 As a result, the two forces often collide — a 
 
TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM 
(CONTEMP. POL. THEORY, Ian Shapiro ed., 2004) (suggesting cosmopolitan impartiality 
to nationality and citizenship applies to the distribution of justice while 
accommodating an individual’s independent recognition of nationality); Brian Barry, 
Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 12 (Ian Shapiro & 
Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999) (attacking Statism as a narrow theory); Charles R. Beitz, 
Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 591-600 (1983) 
(explaining the continued influence of nationalism after cosmopolitanism has taken 
root); Robert Fine & Robin Cohen, Four Cosmopolitanism Moments, in CONCEIVING 
COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 137, 137 
(suggesting that cosmopolitanism is not a total anecdote to “nationalism, racism, 
ethnic conflict, and religious fundamentalism”).  
 20 See Gasper, supra note 18, at 1229; see, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND 
BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY (2005) (examining political philosophy’s 
interaction with global politics and questioning which political philosophy should 
govern on a global level); GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE 
MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran 
Cronin eds., 2002) (providing essays considering international institutional responses 
to global crises); see also GARRETT WALLACE BROWN, GROUNDING COSMOPOLITANISM: 
FROM KANT TO THE IDEA OF A COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION 11-14 (2009); LUIS CABRERA, 
POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN CASE FOR THE WORLD STATE 1 
(2004); DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITANISM: IDEALS, REALITIES AND DEFECTS 93-115 (2010); 
CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 21-107 (1999); DARREL 
MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE 7-28 (2002).  
 21 For more views on this phenomenon, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks 
and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV 885, 
887 (2004) (critiquing the principle of territoriality); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime 
Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
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trademark system grounded in territoriality and the emergence of 
harmonized systems of branding, marketing, and registration. 
Admittedly, given how broad the field of cosmopolitanism has 
become, and its vast history, it can mean a variety of things — 
everything from an attitude or a value, to a kind of global governance, 
to a set of views on social structures and beyond.22 Yet trademarks, 
and global brands, are often a central vehicle by which these general 
approaches to cosmopolitanism specifically and symbolically unfold, 
and often the terrain under which conflicts over globalization and 
localization take place. As a result, trademark cosmopolitanism, one 
might argue, is thus inextricably linked to global flows of content, and 
as content and brands circulate transnationally, so do the legal 
principles of intellectual property that underpin them. The same is 
also true for the social and political movements that have also emerged 
surrounding the rise of global brands. Even the forces that oppose 
globalization and the rise of multinational corporations, I would 
argue, reflect a kind of cosmopolitan ethic that is worth further 
analysis and study.23 This phenomenon also includes a wide array of 
 
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Regime Shifting] (exploring the 
relationship between TRIPS and intellectual property); Ruth L. Okediji, The 
International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country 
Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315 
(2003) (arguing that the dominant narratives of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia support, 
rather than question, current international intellectual property law); Peter K. Yu, The 
International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 833 (2007) (arguing that 
heightened protection of intellectual property rights has adverse effects on developing 
and impoverished countries); Robert Stoll, Statement at United States House of 
Representatives: Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Economy: Current 
Trends and Future Challenges (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
news/speeches/2009/2009Dec9.jsp (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (discussing the 
emergence of international intellectual property law in relation to U.S. policy); and 
Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 227 (1996) (stating “that uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights around the world would promote the expansion of international trade, 
global economic growth, and job creation”). 
 22 See Ian Woodward et al., Attitudes Towards Globalization and Cosmopolitanism: 
Cultural Diversity, Personal Consumption and the National Economy, 59 BRIT. J. SOC. 
207, 208 (2008) (making this observation).  
 23 Several legal scholars have also studied similar themes with respect to the 
globalization of intellectual property. See, e.g., LOUISE BERNIER, JUSTICE IN GENETICS: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE 
(Edward Elgar ed., 2010) (discussing cosmopolitization in relation to distribution of 
intellectual property as health resources); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and 
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 
1341-42 (1996) (discussing the difficulties of conflicting legal regimes and 
globalization in relation to intellectual property law); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a 
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third parties who are, directly or indirectly, broadly implicated in the 
process of global branding, either because they support the process, 
like consumers, or because they oppose it, like anti-globalization 
activists. All of these elements encompass descriptive and normative 
aspects to their approaches, and they also underwrite some of the most 
important challenges for trademark law in the future. 
A. From National Brand to Global Icon: Consumptive Cosmopolitanism 
In 1983, in a groundbreaking article for the Harvard Business 
Review, Professor Theodore Levitt claimed that a global market for 
standardized, uniform products and services had emerged.24 To 
maximize the opportunities that this market presented, Levitt 
recommended selling standardized products in a wide variety of 
 
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global 
Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005) (discussing problems of choice-of-law and the 
recognition of judgments in relation to intellectual property); Margaret Chon, Law 
Professor as Artist: Themes and Variations in Keith Aoki’s Intellectual Property 
Scholarship, 90 OR. L. REV. 1251 (2012) (discussing the work of Keith Aoki); Shubha 
Ghosh, Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal Criminal Trade Secret Law, 9 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 24 (2009) (focusing on the intersection between 
boundaries in intellectual property law and those in immigration policy); Amy 
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 820 (2008) (discussing the recent countermobilization 
against strong international property law); Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual 
Property in the Globalization Epoch: The Integration of Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135 (2004) (examining the perceived conflict between the 
centrifugal focus of the attempt to integrate customary regimes for knowledge 
protection into the IP discourse, and the phenomenon of globalization as symbolized 
by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement); 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century: Need for 
Stronger “Democratic Ownership” and Cosmopolitan Reforms, 31 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 
17 (2011) (discussing the relation between international economic law and human 
rights law); Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in International Intellectual 
Property Law, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1021 (2007) (questioning whether the infusion of 
human rights concepts and rhetoric will serve, on balance, to make international IP 
rights more socially just); Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: 
Intellectual Property and the Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195 
(2010) (analyzing the community that the Access Movements create through their 
critiques and proposals concerning the division of property and power in our 
networked world).  
 24 See Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 
1983, at 92, 92-102; see also Susan P. Douglas et al., Integrating Branding Strategy 
Across Markets: Building International Brand Architecture, 9 J. INT’L MARKETING 97, 101 
(2001); Douglas B. Holt et al., How Global Brands Compete, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 
2004, at 68, 69 [hereinafter Global Brands]; John Ruff, The Globalization of a Food 
Processor, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 727, 727 (1996) (discussing the globalization of the 
Kraft brand).  
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geographic contexts and markets. Commenting on Levitt’s article, 
years later, brand scholars Douglas Holt and others explained that 
even though Levitt did not explicitly discuss branding, his ideas were 
interpreted to suggest the need for greater standardization and 
uniformity — not just among products, but among brand identities — 
giving rise to the growth of the global branding phenomenon.25 
Thirty years after Levitt’s article was published, we see dramatic 
shifts in the standardization of both goods and of trademarks globally. 
Corporations, just like individuals, have adopted a global outlook and 
approach in many aspects of their day-to-day practices regarding 
brand management. Today, international branding comprises much 
more than just a selection of brand names — remember the famous 
Chevy Nova story, where “No Va” translated into “no go” in Spanish 
— but it is also about auditory, visual, emotional brand design.26 The 
process of global branding, for example, has been described to 
encompass everything from companies that use an identical marketing 
strategy across countries to others which utilize a similar brand with 
some variations in different markets.27 Other definitions of global 
 
 25 See Colin Grant, Theodore Levitt’s Marketing Myopia, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 397, 399 
(1999) (“While the specific tone of Levitt’s tactic might not prove particularly effective 
today, the level at which it aims, that of our most basic dreams and desires, remain 
crucial for contemporary advertising.”); Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69; 
see also Jeryl Whitelock & Carole Pimblett, The Standardisation Debate in International 
Marketing, 10 J. GLOBAL MARKETING 45, 45-46 (1997); Yoram Wind, The Myth of 
Globalization, 3 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 23, 23 (1986); Shaoming Zou & S. Tamer 
Cavusgil, The GMS: A Broad Conceptualization of Global Marketing Strategy and Its 
Effect on Firm Performance, 66 J. MARKETING, Oct. 2002, at 40, 41 (citing Levitt’s 
standardization perspective as “perhaps the most influential view” on global 
marketing strategy).  
 26 See Bernd Schmitt, From the Special Issue Editor, 10 J. INT’L MARKETING, SPECIAL 
ISSUE ON GLOBAL BRANDING, Summer 2002, at 2, 2-3 (containing excellent empirical 
papers on global trademarks and brands).  
 27 See, e.g., David A. Aaker & Erich Joachimsthaler, The Lure of Global Branding, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 137 (discussing the principles that successful global 
branding employs); Dana L. Alden et al., Brand Positioning Through Advertising in Asia, 
North America, and Europe: The Role of Global Consumer Culture, 63 J. MARKETING, Jan. 
1999, at 75 (examining “the emergence of brand positioning strategies in advertising that 
parallel the growth of the global marketplace”); Douglas et al., supra note 24 (discussing 
the “implications for the design and management of the firm’s international brand 
architecture”); Andy Pike, Geographies of Brands and Branding, 33 PROGRESS HUM. 
GEOGRAPHY 619, 619 (2009) (“seek[ing] to elucidate the geographies of brands and 
branding through interpreting their geographical entanglements.”); Larry Roellig, 
Designing Global Brands: Critical Lessons, 12 DESIGN MGMT. J. 40 (2001) (highlighting “the 
numerous strategic and tactical considerations to keep in mind when producing a global 
brand expression”); Martin S. Roth, The Effects of Culture and Socioeconomics on the 
Performance of Global Brand Image Strategies, 32 J. MARKETING RES. 163 (1995) (studying 
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branding focus instead on the building of brand equity internationally, 
and still others focus on the harmonization of an international brand 
and marketing architecture.28 
In turn, just as brands now reflect a kind of global consciousness 
and design, globalization has also produced a generation of 
cosmopolitanist consumers.29 This emerging culture is not tied to a 
singular global brand, or a culture of homogeneity, but a global 
culture instead — enabling consumers to “see themselves in relation 
to other cultures as well as their own.”30 This is not to suggest that 
consumers share the same tastes, but rather, that they participate in a 
shared conversation that often centers around the presence and 
participation of global brands. “Like entertainment stars, sports 
celebrities and politicians,” Douglas Holt writes, “global brands have 
become a lingua franca for consumers all over the world.”31 Anecdotal 
evidence further demonstrates these conclusions — “Global brands 
make us feel like citizens of the world, and . . . they somehow give us 
an identity,” one Argentinian consumer observed.32 
Reading some of the vast literature on global branding, one is struck 
by the immediate similarity of its descriptive and normative insights to 
 
the differing cultural effects on brand performance); Sandeep Saxena, Challenges and 
Strategies of Global Branding in Indian Market, IOSR J. BUS. & MGMT., Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 
38 (discussing the six challenges (6E’s) and the strategies of global marketing); Kasia 
Moreno, What’s Easier: To Make a Billion Dollars, Build a Global Company or Create a 
Global Brand?, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
forbesinsights/2013/04/09/whats-easier-to-make-a-billion-dollars-build-a-global-company-
or-create-a-global-brand/ (discussing how innovation in a given country affects marketing 
strategy); Schumpeter, Emerging-Market Companies are Trying to Build Global Brands, 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559894/ (discussing the 
hardships associated with global branding). 
 28 See Pike, supra note 27, at 626-27 (citing sources).  
 29 See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 75; Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, The Psychology of 
Globalization, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 774, 774 (2002); Rejeev Batra et al., Effects of 
Brand Local and Nonlocal Origin on Consumer Attitudes in Developing Countries, 9 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 83, 83 (2000); Ernest Dichter, The World Customer, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jul.Aug. 1962, at 113, 113; France Leclerc et al., Foreign Branding and Its Effects 
on Product Perceptions and Attitude, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 263, 268 (1994); Yuliya 
Strizhakova et al., Branded Products as a Passport to Global Citizenship: Perspectives 
from Developed and Developing Countries, 16 J. INT’L MARKETING, Dec. 2008, at 57, 57; 
see, e.g., GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY (Westby et al. eds., 2004) 
(discussing how globalization has affected different social institutions, including 
consumers).  
 30 Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 70. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 71. Another consumer from New Zealand echoed similarly, “Global 
brands make you feel part of something bigger and give you a sense of belonging.” Id. 
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the literature on cosmopolitanism. Some authors, for example, tend to 
focus on the notion of cosmopolitanism as a fundamental set of 
identities that involve a sense of “belonging . . . to the world as a 
whole,” a kind of global citizenry that reflects transnational 
perspectives.33 Other authors tend to describe cosmopolitanism in 
terms of a set of identities, values, and attitudes that variously embrace 
notions of diverse world perspectives, and a strong degree of openness 
to others. This type of cultural competence embraces global diversity 
in terms of food, music, self-presentation, and ethical world views.34 
As the prior sentence suggests, part of the culture of 
cosmopolitanism is deeply tied to consumer practices of consumption, 
and it is also linked to visual brand culture as well. Our sense of the 
world around us — our very language and ways of thinking and 
framing our environments — are deeply inscribed and circumscribed 
by the brands and advertising that inhabit our everyday world. Brands, 
like cosmopolitanist approaches, have symbolic, emotional, and 
cultural aspects. And as brands become more and more global in their 
design and interpretative reach, it makes sense that our cosmopolitan 
world view becomes reflected through patterns of consumption and 
changes in consumer identity.35 Twenty years ago, global branding 
 
 33 See Nancy E. Cook, Canadian Development Workers, Transnational Encounters 
and Cultures of Cosmopolitanism, 27 INT’L SOC. 3, 5-6 (2012) (suggesting three aspects 
— one normative, one political, and one cultural); Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 
209 (“[Cosmopolitanism is] an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward 
divergent cultural experiences.” (quoting Ulf Hannerz, Cosmopolitans and Locals in 
World Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY: A 
THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY SPECIAL ISSUE 242-43 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990))). 
Other, cultural approaches to cosmopolitanism, for example, center on increasing 
tolerance for diversity and cultural competence, see Cook, supra, at 5. For example, 
one author defines the cosmopolitan as possessing a “willingness to engage with the 
other.” Id. at 6; see also Michele Lamont & Sada Aksartova, Ordinary 
Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Racial Boundaries Among Working-Class Men, 
19 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Aug. 2002, at 1, 2; Loren B. Landau & Iriann 
Freemantle, Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and Self-
Exclusion in Johannesburg, 36 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 375, 380 (2010).  
 34 See Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 208. 
 35 See generally Russell Adams, Fragmentation and Segmentation: Marketing Global 
Benefits, 10 INT’L BUS. ECON. RES. J. 59, 60 (2011) (discussing branding as building 
global communities); Lee Jung-Wan & Simon Tai, Young Consumers’ Perceptions of 
Multinational Firms and Their Acculturation Channels Towards Western Products in 
Transition Economies, 1 INT’L J. EMERGING MARKETS 212 (2006) (documenting a young 
generation’s view of multinational brands); Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp et al., How 
Perceived Brand Globalness Creates Brand Value, 34 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 53 (2003) 
(explaining how globalness effects brand purchase); Alladi Venkatesh & Suguna 
Swamy, India as an Emerging Consumer Society: A Critical Perspective, in RESEARCH IN 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: CONSUMPTION IN MARKETIZING ECONOMIES (Clifford J. Shultz II et 
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scholars argued that the less consumerized a market is, the more the 
emphasis is on the utilitarian aspects of a brand, and its link to the 
marketplace. Today, all of that has shifted in favor of advertising that 
trends towards being more symbolic, and more emotional in order to 
connect to the consumer. Trademarks, today, are less about 
identifications of origin; instead, their earlier function has been 
surpassed by their growing role as “messengers” that convey a broad 
range of information to the public about the product, the company, 
the people behind the company, and the attributes of each.36 As a 
result, the trademark represents both a global visual receptacle and a 
vehicle for all of the emotive and personality characteristics that 
advertisers hope to associate with a particular brand.37 Obviously as 
markets become globalized, brands — and individuals — do as well.38 
More recently, although the rush towards global branding has 
waned at different points, it has also given rise to a greater push 
towards localized customization to suit consumer tastes, a “glocal” 
strategy, as some have called it.39 For example, Kraft general foods 
markets Philadelphia cream cheese globally, but it differs its approach 
— so in the United States we are encouraged to eat it on bagels, but in 
Spain, they sell a salmon-flavored version; Germany gets a pear-
flavored version; Italy, a tuna version. McDonalds does something 
similar — you can get wine with your burger in France, or beer in 
Germany, or an Indian potato burger in India.40 All of this, of course, 
depends on the interplay between satisfying and constructing 
consumer preferences, depending upon the context.41 
 
al. eds., 7th ed. 1994) (arguing that consumers in developing nations have a 
preference for global brands because consuming them gives them a sense that they are 
a part of a global community).  
 36 Matthew James Elsmore, The Implications of Intellectual Property Law for the 
Auditing and Protection of National and International Brands: Part III. Brands in Europe, 
15 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 209, 210 (2000).  
 37 See Ming Hsieh, Identifying Brand Image Dimensionality and Measuring the 
Degree of Brand Globalization: A Cross National Study, 10 J. INT’L MARKETING, SPECIAL 
ISSUE ON GLOBAL BRANDING, Summer 2002, at 46, 59.  
 38 See Julio Cerviño & Jose Maria Cubillo, A Resource Based Perspective on Global 
Branding: An Analysis of Trademark Registration Data, 21 INT’L J. MGMT. 451, 460 
(2004).  
 39 Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69. 
 40 See Elsmore, supra note 36, at 224-25.  
 41 For example, with respect to goods like laundry detergent — some markets 
prefer “green” detergents and are willing to pay a premium, others care less about 
these issues, but face a wide diversity in machines, water temperature, and 
preferences, requiring greater creativity in marketing. See id. 
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Today, Coca-Cola soft drinks and Marlboro cigarettes are the top 
two global brands. Soft drinks, tobacco, pet foods, and snack foods are 
other areas with the greatest global brand presence.42 Not only are 
global branding strategies economical from an efficiency perspective, 
because they enable one company to use one advertising agency for its 
global reach, but they also help centralize the messaging and 
personality that surrounds a global brand.43 Further, not only do they 
enable the creation of a global brand identity, but they are also 
thought to offer a number of benefits to the consumer, namely 
credibility, authority, value, and power, and the feeling of belonging to 
a global community.44 Some empirical evidence has shown, for 
example, that people tend to endorse the idea that globalization will 
enhance their opportunities to consume products from around the 
world, and relatedly, that sampling from and learning about different 
cultures is a widely appealing endeavor.45 
However, cosmopolitanism is not an enterprise free from critique 
and concern. Some scholars have critiqued cosmopolitanism for its 
close relationship to notions of empire, capitalism, and western idioms 
of thought, expressing concern that it facilitates “an improving 
conversion of the local other into the western universal.”46 One must 
be careful not to presume that both cosmopolitanism and globalization 
are always connected — as one author points out, it is both 
historically and empirically unwarranted to view globalization as a 
precondition for cosmopolitanism.47 One can be globalized, but still 
lacking the definitive consciousness that cosmopolitanism brings, 
desiring insularity, nationalism, and parochialism. 
Further, there remain substantial and quite valid concerns about the 
impact of globalization on cultural and consumer diversity.48 Global 
 
 42 Dennis Pitta, Foundations for Building Share of Heart in Global Brands, 17 J. 
PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 64, 66 (2008).  
 43 Aaker & Joachimsthaler, supra note 27, at 137. 
 44 See Hsieh, supra note 37, at 60-61. 
 45 Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 217 (showing 85–95% of respondents to a 
survey endorse these views). 
 46 Cook, supra note 33, at 5 (citation omitted).  
 47 See Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 210. 
 48 See, e.g., RITZER, supra note 29 (discussing the affect of globalized corporate 
structure on the international community); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (1991) 
(exploring the relationship between the globalization of the financial industry and the 
growth of global cities); SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988) 
(discussing cultural changes in manufacturing nations, especially South-East Asia and 
the Caribbean Basin, as well as changes in market locations such as California, New 
York, and New Jersey). 
  
892 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:875 
consumer culture has been described as “a cultural identity not 
associated with a single country, but rather a larger group generally 
recognized as international and transcending individual national 
cultures.”49 There are, of course, distributional effects of these social 
formations — one scholar writes that the “rise of global consumption 
ideals, potentially makes the elite among Third World consumers into 
cosmopolitans who are more concerned with how they compare to the 
world’s privileged consumers than they are to compare themselves 
locally.”50 Other anecdotal and theoretical treatments of this issue have 
emphasized the increasing homogeneity of the global consumer, to the 
point that localized cultures and tastes may play a secondary role to 
the dominance of global brand identity. Even empirical studies have 
suggested this to be the case.51 Other studies argue, as a variation, that 
“increasing globalization has reduced the homogeneity of consumer 
behaviors within countries, while increasing communalities among 
consumers across countries.”52 Central to this process, nevertheless, is 
the desire to own the “consumption symbols” or goods from countries 
whose lifestyles are admired.53 Here, brands become a central part of 
the sign of membership in a global cosmopolitan community, of 
membership in a “transnational commerce culture.”54 
 
 49 See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 80. 
 50 Mark Cleveland, Michel Laroche & Nicolas Papadopoulos, Cosmopolitanism, 
Consumer Ethnocentrism, and Materialism: An Eight-Country Study of Antecedents and 
Outcomes, 17 J. INT’L MARKETING 116, 120 (2009) (quoting Russell Belk, Consumption 
Patterns of the New Elite in Zimbabwe, 20 J. MACROMARKETING 204 (2000)); see also 
Güliz Ger & Russell W. Belk, I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke: Consumptionscapes of 
the “Less Affluent World,” 19 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 271, 272-73 (1996). 
 51 One study concludes that while localized behaviors still matter, “a global 
consumer is beginning to emerge to some degree,” noting that mass communication 
has the ability to “break down national identity.” Bruce Keillor, Michael D’Amico & 
Veronica Horton, Global Consumer Tendencies, 18 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 1, 15-16 
(2001). 
 52 Mark Cleveland & Michel Laroche, Acculturation to the Global Consumer 
Culture: Scale Development and Research Paradigm, 60 J. BUS. RES. 249, 250 (2007) 
(emphasis in original); cf. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 
544-48 (2001) (making a similar argument with respect to culture and social 
movements). 
 53 Cleveland & Laroche, supra note 52, at 253.  
 54 See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 77 (quoting Ulf Hannerz, Cosmopolitans and 
Locals in World Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND 
MODERNITY: A THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY SPECIAL ISSUE 242-43 (Mike Featherstone 
ed., 1990)). 
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B. The Rise of Corporate Cosmopolitanism 
So far, I have outlined how a cosmopolitan world view has become 
reflected in the process of global branding and transnational 
consumption, both by corporations and also by individuals. But for 
Nussbaum and others, cosmopolitanism is also deeply tied to a notion 
of ethics, a concept of duty to other individuals. Here, too, trademark 
law becomes intimately tied to the process of creating greater attention 
to corporate social responsibility, particularly in the creation of global 
brands. 
As companies become more globalized, and multinational in 
character, and the design and creation of brands have followed suit, 
consumers have also followed this trend, focusing their attention on 
the global business practices of the companies that they patronize. 
While there is a vast literature on corporate social responsibility 
(“CSR”) and its various forms, I want to sketch out, briefly here, some 
of the complementarities between modern CSR approaches and the 
phenomenon of trademark cosmopolitanism that I have described so 
far.55 
Although the term “corporate social responsibility” was coined by 
economist Howard Bowen a decade after Nuremberg,56 its modern 
formation tends to emphasize the need for corporations to consider 
the social and ecological impact of their practices on humanity as a 
whole, and without ceasing to remain a profit generating entity.57 
While the field of CSR traditionally refers to the protection of human 
rights, labor rights, the environment, and non-corrupt business 
practices, among other considerations,58 it also connects deeply to 
notions of trademark cosmopolitanism for a variety of reasons. 
First, as the previous section suggested, the brand’s visuality often 
becomes the central repository for all the ancillary conflicts that 
surround a corporation — social, political, economic, etc. As a result, 
in order to protect their brands from public reproach, most companies 
 
 55 For more information on CSR see Corporate Social Responsibility, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd.org/business/issues/sr.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 
2013); CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE, http://www.csrwire.com/ categories/23-Corporate-
Social-Responsibility/press_releases (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); and Devin Thorpe, 
Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility Will Move You to Act, FORBES 
(May 18, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2013/05/18/why-
csr-the-benefits-of-corporate-social-responsibility-will-move-you-to-act.  
 56 See Jonathan Bellish, Towards a More Realistic Vision of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Through the Lens of the Lex Mercatoria, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 548, 
558 (2012). 
 57 See id. at 560. 
 58 Id.  
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now engage in proactive strategies that infuse the brand’s personality 
with information about a company’s desirable business practices and 
its commitment to social responsibility.59 Information about corporate 
practices in each of these areas — human rights, labor, the 
environment, etc. — deeply affects the way in which the brand is 
viewed. Think, for example, of how companies like British Petroleum 
have had to rebrand themselves after evidence of their ethical or 
environmental practices came to light.60 
Second, it also connects to consumers’ own cosmopolitanism, 
reflected in their global buying practices. As consumers view 
themselves as global citizens, they increasingly offer concern for the 
manufacturing practices of the companies that they patronize. For 
example, consider the maelstrom of media attention that focused on 
Apple after evidence of its iPhone manufacturing practices came to 
light.61 Third, and relatedly, the brand becomes the visual cue for the 
information that the consumer possesses about a company’s labor 
practices. That is why the relationship between a company’s brand 
managers and activist antibranding movements can be so contentious 
for trademark lawyers.62 By recoding brands in ways that highlight a 
 
 59 See Douglas B. Holt et al., How Model Behavior Brings Market Power: Consumers 
Associate Global Brands with Good Quality But Also Hold Global Companies to Higher 
Ethical Standards, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2004), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e4c539c-
f4a0-11d8-9911-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2fSAilHhN. 
 60 Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 984-85 
(2011); Jennifer Sawayda & O.C. Ferrell, BP Gulf Coast Disaster and Recovery, 
CENGAGE LEARNING 1, 1-4, http://cengagesites.com/academic/assets/sites/4004/BP_ 
1439042233_250174_WM.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2013); see also Rebranding 
Blackwater: Your Brand Is Much More than Your Name & Logo, VISIBLE LOGIC INC. (May 
21, 2009), http://www.visiblelogic.com/blog/2009/05/rebranding-blackwater-your-
brand-is-much-more-than-your-logo/ (discussing a company’s motivation to rebrand).  
 61 See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, Will Child Labour Claims Stop You Buying Apple?, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/ 
2010/mar/01/apple-ipod (discussing allegations that children manufactured Apple 
products); Farhad Manjoo, Apple in China: The iPhone Maker Should Ditch Its Troubling 
Labor Practices and Reinvent Gadget Manufacturing, HUFF. POST (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/apple-china-foxconn_n_1246693.html 
(discussing the working conditions of Chinese employees producing Apple products); 
Bill Ray, 40,000 Apple Fanbois Demand Ethical iPhone 5, REGISTER (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/01/ethical_iphone/ (discussing a petition 
requesting better working conditions for employees who make Apple products); 
Katherine Yau, Apple Product Sales at an All-Time High, Labor Practices at Dangerous 
Low, GOLDEN GATE EXPRESS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.goldengatexpress.org/2012/ 
03/07/apple-products/ (discussing the need to refrain from buying Apple products as 
long as there are poor working conditions in the factories).  
 62 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676-78 (2003).  
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company’s connection to environmental degradation, unfair labor 
practices, or other issues of social justice, activists can further inform 
the public and — literally — alter the semiotic significance of a 
particular brand to the public. That is why branding often plays such a 
powerful role in disputes about CSR.63 
There are other, proactive branding strategies that further 
underscore a commitment to CSR.64 One of the key ways in which 
corporations address their CSR is through the marketplace — 
including “rights-sensitive” branding strategies, codes of conduct, 
voluntary submissions to auditing practices, and shareholder 
pressure.65 “Rights-sensitive” branding involves the practice of offering 
a particular selection of goods to consumers who are willing to pay a 
premium for ethically sourced materials — like Starbucks’ “fair trade” 
coffees, Chiquita’s “ethical banana” marketed in Europe, and the 
Kimberly Process of reducing conflict diamonds in the marketplace.66 
Other market-based solutions also have branding implications as well 
— Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, and others have adopted private codes of 
conduct that are often used to buttress their reputations on the global 
branding platform.67 
 
 63 It also helps explain why the most prominent global brands often have the best 
reputations for CSR. See, for example, Jacquelyn Smith, The Companies With the Best CSR 
Reputations, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/ 
2012/12/10/the-companies-with-the-best-csr-reputations/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013), for a 
discussion that Forbes’s ranking of the companies with the best corporate social 
responsibility are also companies with the most prominent global brands. See Being a 
Responsible Company, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2013) (stating “[a]s we have grown to now more than 18,000 stores in over 
60 countries, so too has our commitment to corporate citizenship” and noting Starbucks’s 
commitment to ethical sourcing); Corporate Responsibility Report: FY 10–11, NIKE, INC., 
http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/report/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); Microsoft 2012 
Citizenship Report, MICROSOFT 62, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/ 
en-us/reporting/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (noting its commitment to global citizenship); 
Sustainable Business Performance Summary: Striving for Better Performance, NIKE, INC., 
http://nikeinc.com/pages/responsibility (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (“As environmental, 
social and economic challenges in our world proliferate, they demand our best performance. 
We’re using the power of our brand, the energy and passion of our people and the scale of 
our business to create meaningful change.”). 
 64 See Ellisha Nasruddin & Reevany Bustami, The Yin and Yang of CSR Ethical 
Branding, 12 ASIAN ACAD. MGMT. J. 83, 83-85 (2007).  
 65 Bellish, supra note 56, at 567. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Some have argued that the “rights-sensitive” branding approach only affects a 
small segment of consumers, those that are not price sensitive, but highly value 
sensitive. Indeed, most of the companies that engage in fair trade and ethically 
sourced practices tend to be premium brands, which suggests that consumers that 
purchase these goods tend to be willing — and able — to pay a premium. Admittedly, 
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Of course, that is not the only practical strategy of CSR visibility — 
other companies, like Shell Nigeria, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, 
and Union Carbide also engage in rebranding and CSR-type behavior 
after a major disaster, attempting to retain consumers by taking 
measures to restore their reputation.68 Other companies engage in 
voluntary codes of conduct — Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss, and other 
companies employ inspectors who grade suppliers on labor standards 
and attempt to ensure fairer practices.69 These practices are both 
represented and reinforced by massive advertising campaigns that are 
also infused with branding these companies’ social responsibility and 
further informing the public of their activities. Here, the global brand 
is actively linked to the culture and ethics of cosmopolitanism, albeit 
indirectly, further underlining how trademarks provide the visual, 
symbolic vehicle to communicate such information. 
C. The Role of Institutionalized Cosmopolitanism 
Of course, trademark cosmopolitanism would be deeply ineffective 
if it were not for the way in which both legal and political systems 
have adjusted to facilitate the production of global brands to suit 
consumer preferences. Here, too, we can find key synergies with 
traditional cosmopolitanist approaches, particularly those which focus 
on the growth of institutional frameworks. For example, one of the 
most prominent articulations of modern institutional cosmopolitanism 
stems from Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the idea of membership 
to the community of humanity as a whole.70 Kant developed this idea 
in the context of a world federation that focused on cosmopolitanism 
as a form of right, along with the growth of world trade and a global 
public sphere.71 In more contemporary times, Jack Goldsmith, in his 
 
these companies affect a smaller share of the consuming public, but they do provide 
visibility to the importance of ethical corporate behavior, which in turn may affect the 
proliferation of global branding practices and the political meanings the public 
associates with them. Id. at 567-68.  
 68 Id. at 573. 
 69 Id. at 574.  
 70 Pheng Cheah, Cosmopolitanism, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 486, 487-89 
(2006). 
 71 See id. at 487; see also G. PASCAL ZACHARY, THE GLOBAL ME: NEW COSMOPOLITANS 
AND THE COMPETITIVE EDGE: PICKING GLOBALISM’S WINNERS AND LOSERS, at x-xiii (2000); 
Timothy Brennan, At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now, in CONVERGENCES: 
INVENTORIES OF THE PRESENT 148 (Edward W. Said ed., 1997); Pheng Cheah, 
Introduction II: The Cosmopolitical — Today, in COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 10, at 22-
28; David A. Hollinger, Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and the United States, in 
IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 92 (Noah M.J. Pickus ed., 1998); 
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writing on cosmopolitanism, similarly writes of a recent turn to a 
more institutionalized sense of cosmopolitanism — the idea that 
duties attach to domestic institutions (e.g., national governments) 
and, derivatively, to international institutions.72 
These ideals also resonate in the complex world of international 
intellectual property. In just the past few decades, we have seen a 
massive rise in systems of intellectual property harmonization, along 
with the simultaneous rise of global branding and trademarking 
practices. While the two may or may not be causally related, they 
suggest that the institutional growth of transnational entities to 
regulate trademarks raises related questions regarding the aftereffects 
of globalization on both legal and political systems. The Paris 
Convention and TRIPS both obligate parties to create and provide 
minimum standards of protection for trademarks, but this process has 
been messy, costly, and deeply fraught with conflict for some nations, 
particularly across the developing world.73 
Yet as applied to trademarks, the institutional afterlife of 
cosmopolitanism reveals a complex reordering of the notion of 
national borders, one that is largely scripted by the transnational 
 
Hollinger, Not Universalists, supra note 19, at 239 (distinguishing between 
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Origins of Soviet Ethnogenetics, 55 SLAVIC REV. 826, 834 (1996).  
 72 Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
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RELATIONS 144-55 (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & 
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(2011).  
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Asymmetric Negotiation, 1993 Third World Econ. 9, 10; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing A Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to 
Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1188-89, 1201-04 
(2009); Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 743-45, 768-72 (1996); Paul J. Heald, Mowing the 
Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 249, 297-99 (2003); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: 
Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 
452 (2000); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 
371, 375-76 (2006); Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries 
into a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y 
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.iatp.org/files/What_It_Will_Take_to_Get_Developing_ 
Countries_.htm.  
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circulation of global brands. Some brands, of course, begin as local 
markets and then expand internationally, and others are actually 
designed to be global at their outset. The emergence of transnational 
systems — TRIPS, the Madrid system, and Europe’s Community 
Trademark system, among others — shift the process of branding 
from a national or local enterprise to one where companies must 
imagine, at the moment of brand creation, how their brands will fare 
on the worldwide stage. “At Novartis,” for example, one spokesperson 
explains, “we only have global branding concepts. Our products are 
introduced at the global scale.”74 
Thus, just as global branding is now an integral part of any 
multinational marketing enterprise, global trademark registration is an 
essential part of the portfolio for any growing business. In Eastern 
Europe, for example, companies had registered marks for over a 
decade prior to the fall of communism in markets that had not even 
opened yet.75 Empirical evidence has shown how trademarks have 
dramatically risen in power, as companies have chosen to engage in far 
more trademarking and branding activity than in prior years, 
suggesting that trademarks comprise a much greater proportion of 
countries’ GDP.76 
The increase in trademarking activity — coupled with the rise of 
global branding — has also spurred some significant international 
changes. More and more companies are choosing to register 
trademarks in other countries; WIPO has reported a significant 
increase in nonresident applications for trademarks, mostly from 
applicants who reside in higher income countries. Consider some 
statistics: According to WIPO, the number of trademarks has 
increased from 500,000 in 1985 to over two million in 2007.77 From 
2009 to 2010, for example, the world saw a 21.4% increase in the 
 
 74 Roya Ghafele, Trademark Owner’s Perspective on the Madrid System: Practical 
Experiences and Theoretical Underpinnings, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 160, 166 
(2007). 
 75 Mitchell Smith, Trade Marks and the Protection of Cultural Integrity 8 (Working 
Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395548.  
 76 The expanding economic role for trademarks in national economies is dramatic. 
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The Rise of Trade Marking in Australia in the 1990s 3 (Melb. Inst. of Applied Econ. and 
Soc. Res. Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 8/03, 2003); see also Smith, supra note 75, 
at 2.  
 77 Loundes & Rogers, supra note 76, at 6 (citing Statistics on Trademarks, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/marks/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013)).  
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global registration of trademarks.78 2011, in turn, saw the highest 
number of international trademark applications ever filed under 
WIPO’s Madrid system, with filings from Russia, the EU, and the 
United States in the lead for the most applications.79 Applications had 
gone up almost 7% over the previous year, to a total of nearly 42,000 
filed that year.80 
Today, the Madrid Protocol remains the most powerful tool for 
brand owners to register their marks in other countries.81 The Madrid 
system is based on two treaties, the Madrid Agreement which is called 
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks (“Madrid Agreement”), adopted in 1891, and the Protocol 
Relating to the Madrid Agreement, adopted in 1989 and in force since 
 
 78 Intellectual Property Filings Worldwide Rebound Strongly in 2010, WIPO 8, 
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(last visited Sept. 20, 2013).  
 79 See Record International Trademark Filings in 2011, WIPO (Mar. 12, 2012), 
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 80 See id. 
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on June 27, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-41, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
madrid/en/legal_texts/trtdocs_wo016.html; Thies Bosling, Securing Trademark 
Protection in a Global Economy-the United States’ Accession to the Madrid Protocol, 12 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137 (2004) (arguing the United States acceptance of the 
Madrid Protocol was important and will lead to further integration of international 
trademark laws); John M. Murphy, Demystifying the Madrid Protocol, NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2004) (summarizing the Madrid Protocol and discussing it from a 
U.S. applicant and foreign applicant point of view); L. Donald Prutzman, Overview of 
the Madrid System and the United States Perspective, 25 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 173 (2012); 
Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, International Trademark Prosecution 
Streamlined: The Madrid Protocol Comes into Force in the United States, 12 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 151 (2004) (discussing the implementation of the Madrid Protocol); The 
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TRADEMARK REP. 1430 (2002) (discussing the effect of the Madrid Protocol on U.S. 
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1996.82 The Madrid system enables applicants to file a single 
registration, facilitating the global spread and growth of brands. Under 
the Madrid system, a firm that already has a trademark in one of the 
participating countries can apply to register that mark in other 
participating countries. The top users of the Madrid system utilize a 
global branding strategy, enabling them to market a single brand in 
multiple markets, reflecting both market power and dominance.83 One 
business owner said that Madrid is essential for a global branding 
strategy: “Through Madrid we can get quicker into markets. This 
means we gain time and the whole management of IP is different. 
There are not 50 different systems, but everything is much simpler.”84 
The advantages of the Madrid system are manifold — it reduces the 
costs associated with trademark registration and streamlines the 
process. The Madrid system has been heralded for its low costs — 
Microsoft has claimed that costs have gone down 40% in its 
international filings.85 Empiricists have also found a positive 
correlation between the growth of global trade and the rise of filings 
and renewals under the Madrid system.86 In 1985, there were only 
50,000 nonresident trademark registrations, comprising 28% of the 
global trade marks registered; as compared with 760,000 such 
registrations in 2007, making up now 36% of those marks in 2007.87 
However much the Madrid system does to advance trademark 
cosmopolitanism, it is not perfect. The system is mostly a procedural 
one, it does not actually substantively examine the specific 
trademarks. Instead, the substantive application takes place in the 
originating country, otherwise known as the Country of Origin.88 As a 
result, since trademark laws vary so widely, it is entirely possible to 
 
 82 Ghafele, supra note 74, at 161.  
 83 Smith, supra note 75, at 7 (citing Ghafele, supra note 74, at 166). 
 84 Ghafele, supra note 74, at 166.  
 85 See Transcript from the Video Interview with Microsoft on the Madrid System, 
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/transcript/microsoft.html (last visited Sept. 20, 
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 86 Ghafele, supra note 74, at 161-62. 
 87 Smith, supra note 75, at 6 (citing Eugenia Baroncelli et al., The Global 
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(citing Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks: Summary Report for 
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pdf/summary2007.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013)). 
 88 See Rachelle H. Thompson, Trademarks in International and Comparative Law: 
International Trademark Protection Strategy, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 479, 494 
(2004). 
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have a mark protected in one country but not in another. Similarly, 
these registrations are also deeply dependent on the home country — 
so that whatever happens to the national trademark, an amendment, 
cancellation, denial, withdrawal, happens to the international one as 
well, although it is possible to convert some applications into national 
ones.89 There is also not a lot of room for movement in terms of 
localizing or nationalizing global brands filed under the Madrid system 
— any slight change in the trademark’s status usually requires a 
refile.90 
However mixed some of the reviews may be of the Madrid system, it 
is patently clear that Madrid reflects, in some ways, an 
institutionalized cosmopolitanist outlook that bridges the link 
between corporations and government systems in the process of global 
branding. Even as it actively facilitates global branding, it is also 
intrinsically designed to overlook national differences in trademark 
registration, the protection of speech, and so on. Further, Madrid is 
only one example of the trend towards trademark harmonization. The 
Community Trademark in Europe (“CTM”) is another example of a 
harmonized regime, facilitating a single process of registration for all 
states in Europe. This single registration is valid for all of the member 
countries of the European Union,91 and there are a variety of other, 
international, means towards trademark harmonization. Here, the 
European Trademark Office offers the European Trademark, which 
gives uniform protection for all identical brand names after a single 
registration is filed with the office of harmonization. The CTM is 
widely considered to be a model for future calls towards greater 
trademark harmonization, suggesting that it may serve as an 
inspiration for a future, unitary global system of trademark 
protection.92 
Yet optimistic predictions of the rise of global trademarking can 
often belie a more complicated reality regarding the distributive effects 
of harmonization.93 At the same time that this global trend has 
 
 89 See Ghafele, supra note 74, at 164-65.  
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unfolded, for example, it is important to mention that there are some 
islands of resistance to the global branding trend. One study on the 
Madrid Protocol has discovered, for example, that India and South 
Africa have demonstrated some forms of discrimination in the 
registration process against foreign firms.94 This finding resonates with 
the research done by another scholar, who has found evidence of 
trademark protectionism in China, Hong Kong, India, and South 
Africa, noting that “discrimination is more likely to occur when 
products offered by foreign firms are of similar quality to the ones 
produced by domestic firms.”95 
Further, perhaps one of the greatest issues faced by the rise of 
trademark cosmopolitanism is how to reconcile the protection of 
intellectual property with the protection of other fundamental rights, 
like the freedom of expression. Some countries, like the United States, 
expressly protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, and 
some courts offer specific protections for things like parody; and still 
other commonwealth countries, like the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Australia, do not have a constitutional right to freedom 
of speech, but recognize its existence in statutes or common law.96 In 
addition, there has been very little discussion of the importance of 
protecting freedom of expression at the treaty negotiation level, 
suggesting that many of these issues are considered to be best left to 
the local and regional judicial systems to sort through. For example, 
according to Lisa Ramsey, the legislative history suggests that there 
was almost no discussion of the conflict between trademark rights and 
freedom of expression during the TRIPS negotiations.97 Neither the 
Paris Convention, nor TRIPS, nor the Madrid Protocols have any 
formal declaration of a commitment to freedom of expression, 
suggesting that it never rose to a level of importance as a fundamental 
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part of the international architecture of trademark law. International 
protections of copyright, in contrast, do have protections for freedom 
of expression built into them.98 As the following Part suggests, this 
absence has deep significance for the activist movements that target 
multinational corporations and their practices, and for the flourishing 
of freedom of speech, generally. 
II. THE TRANSNATIONAL ANTIBRAND 
As the previous Part suggested, the emergence of trademark 
cosmopolitanism can often implicate questions about freedom of 
expression as a fundamental right, demonstrating another side to the 
phenomenon of global branding — global antibranding. In just the last 
few decades, a new activist movement has sprung up internationally 
and domestically, engaging in artistic and political activity to challenge 
the expansion of the brand into public discourse.99 Sometimes 
antibrands might target a certain brand for opposition; at other times 
(like Nadia Plesner’s evocation of an LVMH bag to bring attention to 
Darfur), they might utilize a brand for the purposes of political, 
satirical, or humorous commentary on another subject. And yet, the 
ways in which these artists have done so have raised complicated 
questions of identity, language, and control — setting up a clash 
between the international standards for freedom of speech and 
intellectual property.100 
Transnational activism of this sort is also deeply connected to the 
rise of trademark cosmopolitanism, even if there is not always a 
perfect identicality between the two. The rise of the global 
antibranding movement is intimately tied to the rise of global 
branding: one cannot have one without the other, and the 
proportional growth of the antibrand is tied to the growth of the 
brand. Much of the activities of antibrand activists, therefore, is deeply 
 
 98 See Martin Senftleben, The Trademark Tower of Babel — Dilution Concepts in 
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904 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:875 
tied to targeting CSR practices — drawing attention to current events, 
or using brands to comment on issues involving racial inequities, 
distributive injustice, labor issues, and the like. In other words, the 
same elements that contribute to the global consumption of brands 
can often contribute to global anti-consumption of them as well. As 
Rosemary Coombe has written: “Protests against sweatshop labour 
practices, and the movement of big box stores and fast food franchises 
into communities, suggest that the trademark now provides a site and 
a symbol around which to resist forms of commodification that people 
find contrary to their understandings of community and social 
justice.”101 
A. The Rise of Cosmopolitan Political Solidarity 
Benedict Anderson’s famous book Imagined Communities powerfully 
postulated that a nation is conceived, not as a reality, but as a 
collective work of imagination that has emerged from the circulation 
of capital and the rise of print communication.102 From this starting 
point, a number of scholars relied on Anderson for a deeper study of 
nationalism and the territorial impulse.103 Writing on Anderson, 
Partha Chatterjee writes that the newspaper, the novel, and other 
forms of print media “afford the opportunity for individuals to 
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Community (and Nation) in Bulgarian Rural Ritual, 106 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56, 56-
58, 68-69 (2004) (describing Anderson’s work on nationalism as “especially 
catalytic”); Robert J. Foster, Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene, 20 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 235, 238-39, 250, 253-55 (1991); Benjamin I. Schwartz, Culture, 
Modernity, and Nationalism — Further Reflections, 122 DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 
207, 217-22; Kok-Chor Tan, Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice, 5 ETHICAL 
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 431, 453 (2002).  
  
2014] Trademark Cosmopolitanism 905 
imagine themselves as members of larger than face-to-face solidarities, 
of choosing to act on behalf of those solidarities, of transcending by an 
act of political imagination the limits imposed by traditional 
practices.”104 
Today, some have argued, and I would agree, that Anderson’s 
observations can profitably extend to today’s global circulation of 
media, and relatedly, to the emergence of cosmopolitan forms of 
solidarity.105 After all, if print media helped individual citizens imagine 
the nation, then why can the rapid circulation of new media not help 
individuals imagine a similar kind of imagination of a collective, 
cosmopolitanist global identity? And why can the same not be true of 
the transnational consumption of global branding as well? Does the 
transnational circulation of brands signify a new global order, an 
imagined community of consumers — and an imagined community of 
global activists? As Arjun Appardurai observes, these transnational 
solidarities are crafted from, not nationalism, but from a commonality 
of tastes, of pleasures, and of politics, what Appadurai calls 
“communit[ies] of sentiment.”106 
Even as a purely non-legal matter, I would also argue that 
Anderson’s construction of the imagined community perfectly tracks 
similar observations regarding the cosmopolitanist trajectories of both 
 
 104 Partha Chatterjee, Anderson’s Utopia, 29 DIACRITICS, Winter 1999, at 128, 128. 
 105 Maria Kyriakidou, Imagining Ourselves Beyond the Nation? Exploring 
Cosmopolitanism in Relation to Media Coverage of Distant Suffering, 9 STUD. ETHNICITY 
& NATIONALISM 481, 485 (2009); see also Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference 
in the Global Cultural Economy, 7 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, June 1990, at 295, 295-
97. See generally ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
GLOBALIZATION (1996) (discussing Anderson’s “print capitalism” — the notion that 
collective experience through mass media contributes to the creation of imagined 
communities); Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in 
COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing Anderson as part of an overall change 
in the definition of cosmopolitanism). 
 106 Kyriakidou, supra note 105, at 485 (quoting APPADURAI, supra note 105, at 8 
(quoting Arjun Appadurai, Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu India, 
in LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICS OF EMOTION 94 (C.A. Lutz & L. Abu-Lughod eds., 
1990))). Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz described cosmopolitanists in a similar fashion:  
Some of them may wish to redefine the nation . . . others again are in the 
nation but not a part of it. They may be the real cosmopolitans, or they may 
indeed owe a stronger allegiance to some other kind of imagined 
international community . . . . There may be divided commitments, 
ambiguities, and conflicting resonances as well.  
TARROW, supra note 16, at 43-45 (quoting ULF HANNERZ, TRANSNATIONAL 
CONNECTIONS: CULTURE, PEOPLE, PLACES 90 (1996)).  
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global consumption and anti-global activism.107 In the case of global 
consumption, as I suggested in Part I, we see a cosmopolitanist 
trajectory that embraces the increasing unification of global brands 
that operate to help individuals imagine themselves as part of a 
broader, global community of other consumers. But in the case of the 
anti-globalization activist, the lingua franca of the antibrand operates 
similarly, just in reverse. As scholars have argued, many transnational 
activists presume a kind of cosmopolitan solidarity across borders that 
transforms “national citizens into global citizens by creating 
obligations towards people suffering outside the nation.”108 
There is also a fascinating parallel between the cosmopolitanist 
consumption that I detailed in Part I, and the antibranding activists I 
detail in this Part and elsewhere.109 Like consumers of global brands, 
many cosmopolitan activists accept multiplicities of roots and plural 
loyalties, and although they move outside of their spatial origins, they 
continue to be linked to a concept of place and the resources and 
opportunities that place offers them.110 As a result, the imagined 
community, here, is not a community of consumers, but of activists 
who are often deeply critical of the practices of multinational 
corporations and global branding. These activists are defined as 
transnational because they mobilize domestic and international 
resources in order to advance claims on behalf of external actors or in 
favor of goals they may hold in common with other transnational 
allies.111 These individuals typify the trend of “activism beyond 
borders,” and they comprise groups of immigrant and labor activists, 
ecologists, and other political actors who may exist loosely outside of 
state formation.112 
 
 107 See TARROW, supra note 16, at 41-42 (arguing that the cosmopolitanist 
trajectory is far more ethically and politically oriented than other accounts suggest). 
 108 Kyriakidou, supra note 105, at 482 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Kate Nash, Global Citizenship as Show Business: The Cultural 
Politics of Make Poverty History, 30 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 167, 168 (2008)).  
 109 See, e.g., Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, supra note 99 (connecting artistic 
disobedience, activism and antibranding); Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99 
(describing the complex interrelationship between branding and antibranding).  
 110 See TARROW, supra note 16, at 42; see also Mitchell Cohen, Rooted 
Cosmopolitanism, 39 DISSENT, Fall 1992, at 478, 483. 
 111 TARROW, supra note 16, at 43.  
 112 Id. at 9-10 (quoting MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, at xii (1998)). Due to their 
language proficiency and connectedness to international issues, people, and places, 
these activists are able to leverage their more nuanced understanding of society’s 
connectedness on an international level. Id. at 43; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra, at 2 
(discussing the increasing significance and relevancy of activist networks).  
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Indeed, as Douglas Holt has explained, at times, global branding has 
lost its luster precisely because multinational corporations have 
become vulnerable to charges from anti-globalization activists. “Who 
can forget,” Holt writes, “the images of angry demonstrators smashing 
the windows of a McDonald’s outlet in Davos, Switzerland, or 
stomping Coke cans in Seattle?”113 Labor, pollution, and cultural 
imperialism concerns operate at the forefront of activist agendas, 
which tend to coalesce around the global branding enterprise.114 As 
the journalist Naomi Klein recounts in her book, No Logo, the 
antibranding movement operates at the cross-section between art, 
labor, and anti-globalization.115 By targeting companies that have 
invested millions in building strong global brands, antibranders seek 
to expose potential hypocrisy between corporate philosophy and 
corporate activity to the average consumer.116 Indeed, evidence has 
suggested that in countries with weak or underenforced 
environmental regulations, companies tend to adopt private regulatory 
programs only when their overseas clients and shareholders demand 
it.117 As a result, antibranding activism often exploits the same tools 
used in advertising — powerful visuals, brand recognition, catchy 
slogans, and emotionally scripted language — to get their message out 
to the public. 
It is therefore no surprise that much of the world’s most prominent 
trademark cases regarding antibranding have come from one of the 
largest and most international environmental action groups: 
Greenpeace. In 2010, in response to the British Petroleum oil spill in 
the Gulf, Greenpeace, an environmental awareness group, announced 
a contest to “Redesign BP’s logo,” explaining: 
 
 113 Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69. 
 114 Id. at 69-70. 
 115 Rimmer, supra note 101, at 78-80. 
 116 Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99, at 811-12.  
Anti-sweatshop movements were galvanized in 1992 when the National 
Labor Committee performed an expose of corporate and U.S. government 
subsidies of maquilas. Afterward, major labels like the GAP, Nike, Disney, 
and Guess were forced to respond to consumer concerns about their labor 
practices with partners in developing nations, even though they had claimed 
only years earlier to be “innocent global shoppers.”  
Id. (quoting Martin Morris, Contradictions of Post-Modern Consumerism and Resistance, 
64 STUD. POL. ECON. 25, 26 (2001)).  
 117 Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, Signaling Environmental Stewardship in the 
Shadow of Weak Governance: The Global Diffusion of ISO 14001, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
345, 367-68 (2013).  
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A few years ago, BP rebranded themselves as “beyond 
petroleum.” And yet BP is pursuing . . . deepwater drilling, 
despite the massive environmental damage that’s being caused 
by their business. 
That’s why we want you to rebrand them. 
The campaign concludes: “BP’s slick green logo doesn’t suit a 
company that engages in dangerous offshore drilling. We’re inviting 
you to design them a new logo that’s more suitable for their dirty 
business.”118 Greenpeace’s work was particularly effective at changing 
the semiotic import of British Petroleum’s massive advertising 
campaign to highlight its focus on clean energy. After a few of these 
graphic interventions, it was hard to see British Petroleum’s 
advertising campaign in the light it had originally intended.119 
In addition to a growing concern about CSR, a second factor has 
added to the growth in antibranding: the increasing force of 
“consumer sovereignty,” which has led many consumers to respond 
and publicize their complaints against particular corporations.120 
These dynamics have reframed the relationship between advertising 
and consumers into a much more dialogic relationship, as opposed to 
a one-way relationship of corporate inculcation. “Ethical shareholders, 
culture jammers, street reclaimers, McUnion organizers, human rights 
hacktivists, school-logo fighters and Internet corporate watchdogs are 
at the early stages of demanding a citizen-centered alternative to the 
international rule of the brands,” Naomi Klein writes in No Logo.121 In 
many cases, antibranding activists have decidedly turned to the 
advertising executives’ own arsenal of tools to address consumer 
concerns, using appropriative strategies to address the increasing 
dominance of branding strategies in both private and public space. 
 
 118 Redesign BP’s Logo, GREENPEACE (June 15, 2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/ 
usa/news/gulf-oil-spill/bp-logo. 
 119 See Malla Pollack, The Romantic Corporation: Trademark, Trust, and Tyranny, 42 
U. BALT. L. REV. 81, 143 (2012) (discussing BP’s rebranding efforts).  
 120 See Robert Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 503, 503 (2001) (defining consumer sovereignty as “the state of affairs where 
the consumer has the power to define his or her own wants”). For more discussion on 
the role of the consumer, see Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened 
Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 854-62 (2004); Barton Beebe, Search and 
Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2025-26 (2005); Ralph S. 
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 
YALE L.J. 1165, 1180-84 (1948); Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in 
Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 785 (2008). 
 121 Rimmer, supra note 101, at 79 (quoting NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT 
THE BRAND BULLIES 445-46 (2009)). 
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Many of these practices intrinsically raise trademark concerns, 
however. Consider, again, the story of Nadia Plesner and her 
relationship to the crisis in Darfur. Plesner’s ability to use LVMH bags 
as a floating signifier of political import is also, in part, a function of 
the same variety of elements that facilitate brand transnationalism.122 
Yet Plesner felt, like many cosmopolitanists, a moral duty to draw 
attention to the crisis — a keen desire born from a foundational belief 
in the shared responsibility of humankind. Every aspect of her 
political expression — from the conceptualization of the project, to its 
execution, to her attempts to secure legal protection for her expression 
— was tied to other localities.123 Further, Plesner’s intent in drawing a 
transhistorical connection between Picasso’s antiwar position and her 
own critique of celebrity branding, luxury, and contemporary political 
culture was also meant to place use of the LVMH logo at the center of 
her expression. Whereas Picasso’s earlier iconoclastic work of art 
targeted governments, Plesner’s work drew attention to the need for 
targeting global luxury brands and the consumptive practices that 
exalted them. Moreover, as the legal dispute over Nadia Plesner’s work 
demonstrated, much of the conflict played out in reference to the 
global visibility of LVMH’s brand — which operated as a symbol and 
vessel for both commentary on the global presence of luxury brands, 
cosmopolitanist consumption, and the need for international social 
justice and awareness. 
There was no doubt that Plesner’s use of the image was deliberately 
provocative, in that she had already been sued by Louis Vuitton. But it 
is also fascinating that Louis Vuitton chose to pursue a case against 
her when its previous threats against her led to such criticism in the 
press.124 The court’s reaction to the Darfunica case, though, was 
 
 122 See generally TARROW, supra note 16, at 35-56 (discussing the role of the 
availability of rapid forms of personal and digital communication, the widespread use 
of English, the ease of international travel, and the diffuse spread of knowledge from 
the Web). 
 123 She kept a widely read blog on the creation of her painting, Darfunica, making 
daily updates to the painting that were explicitly linked to the ever-changing political 
conditions in the Sudan. See Lucie Guibault, The Netherlands: Darfunica, Miffy and the 
Right to Parody!, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFOR. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 236, 244 (2011) 
(quoting from the translated decision Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 4 mei 2011, KG 2011, 294 
m.nt. (Plesner Joensen/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), translation available at 
http://www.nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living--darfurnica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf).  
 124 There was, however, a key reason for LVMH’s choice to sue. Contrary to the 
settlement in 2008, this time, Plesner — probably in a show of provocation to LVMH 
— planned to market sales of t-shirts and other goods that depicted the same image 
that LVMH had already objected to. When they discovered Plesner’s commercial 
plans, LVMH was, understandably, quite incensed. After the piece was finished, 
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fascinating. Both parties, in fashioning their arguments, relied on 
different sections of the European Convention on Human Rights; 
Plesner relied on the right of freedom of expression, and Louis Vuitton 
relied on the fundamental right to property (and relatedly, intellectual 
property).125 At first, the lower court ruled in favor of LVMH in its bid 
for a preliminary injunction, ruling in favor of its intellectual property 
rights. It concluded that a subsequent use of the picture in an 
announcement for the artist’s upcoming exhibition was an “eye-
catcher,” and thus unjustified because it functioned as an 
advertisement for the artist’s own work.126 But a few months later, the 
same court reversed its position after fully adjudicating the issue, 
deciding to rule in favor of Plesner based on her freedom of expression 
claim instead.127 In an insightful citation, the court explained that 
property rights needed to take a secondary role to the protection of 
freedom of speech, noting: “Opposite Louis Vuitton’s fundamental 
right to peaceful enjoyment of its exclusive rights to the use of the 
design, there is, according to established case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the fundamental right of Plesner that is high 
in a democratic society’s propriety list to express her opinion through 
her art.”128 
Central, of course, to the court’s determination was its conclusion 
that Plesner’s activities, contrary to LVMH’s arguments, did not take 
place in the commercial realm. “[A]rtists enjoy a considerable 
protection with regard to their artistic freedom, in which, in principle, 
art may ‘offend, shock or disturb.’ . . . Plesner’s intention with ‘Simple 
Living’ is not (or was not) to free ride with Louis Vuitton’s reputation 
in a commercial sense,” the court concluded.129 Instead, it found that 
Plesner’s juxtaposition of LVMH logos and glamorous images with the 
 
LVMH again decided to seek action to stop the work from being shown, this time 
from a court in The Hague. Just as it had previously done, the company argued that 
Plesner had illegally appropriated its marks.  
 125 Guibault, supra note 123, at 236. Note that LVMH argued that its fundamental 
right to property was violated, under the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
extended this fundamental right to intellectual property, which the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) did in the Anheuser/Busch decision. Plesner’s freedom of 
expression claim, in contrast, comes from Article 10 of the ECHR, which protects the 
right to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas. See id. at 245. For further 
discussion on Article 10, see Coenraad Visser, The Location of the Parody Defence in 
Copyright Law: Some Comparative Perspectives, 38 CILSA 321, 339-41 (2005).  
 126 See Guibault, supra note 123, at 244 (quoting from a translation of the 
decision). 
 127 See id. at 237. 
 128 See id. at 246. 
 129 Id. 
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crisis in Darfur was consistent with her critique of luxury and 
affluence in a time of famine. Indeed, the court explained her 
motivation as follows: 
[S]he wished to draw attention to the poignant difference 
between luxury and affluence on the one hand, and poverty 
and famine in Darfur on the other hand. She has expressed the 
aspect of luxury by using the Design of [LVMH] in her work 
of art. She has succeeded in her purpose. Partly because of her 
work of art, the genocide in Darfur came to the attention of 
the general public in 2008.130 
It compared Plesner’s symbolic brand appropriation to that of a 
newspaper, ascribing it an informational function by concluding that 
“a newspaper should not have a lesser far-reaching protection of the 
freedom of speech” because it pursues profits with the articles it 
publishes.131 Significantly, in a curt line or two, the court ordered 
LVMH to pay Plesner’s legal fees, and also quashes the previous order 
with retroactive effect, meaning that any penalties that Plesner faced 
would no longer be due.132 
B. Three Antibrand Examples 
Decades ago, Beaumarchais wrote, “Provided that, in my writings, I 
speak neither of the authorities, nor of religion, nor of politics, nor of 
morals, nor of the people in power, nor of the bodies in credit, nor of 
the opera, nor of other performances, nor of anyone who believes in 
anything, I shall be free to print whatsoever I choose, subject to 
inspection by two or three censors.”133 This famous quote, one 
trademark scholar argued, is especially pertinent in this day and age, 
noting that “it would probably now be necessary to add trade marks to 
 
 130 Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 4 mei 2011, KG 2011, 294 m.nt. (Plesner 
Joensen/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), translation available at http://www. 
nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living--darfurnica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf. 
 131 Guibault, supra note 123, at 247.  
 132 See id. at 248. Thrilled with the decision, Plesner told Eyeteeth, a blog, that 
“[t]oday is a great day for art. . . . If I had lost this, I believe it would have caused 
many artists to censor their own work to avoid legal trouble. Now we have won back 
our freedom to make reference to the modern society we live in.” Nadia Plesner on 
Louis Vuitton Case: “This is a Great Day for Art,” EYETEETH (May 4, 2011, 11:22 AM), 
http://eyeteeth.blogspot.com/2011/05/nadia-plesner-on-louis-vuitton-case.html.  
 133 See Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence 
of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371, 371 (2006) [hereinafter “Constitutionalising”] (quoting 
Beaumarchais).  
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the list of subjects that must be treated with delicacy and, in place of 
the censor, the large companies that hold these trade marks.”134 
In some ways, the antibranding activism that has evolved in the last 
decade or so reflects so much of the globalization that it often opposes. 
The problem that our antibranding movements demonstrate, however, 
is that while brands — and even antibrands — are now global and 
cosmopolitanist in character, the doctrinal architecture that protects 
them and enables them to flourish is not. As a result, the existing case 
law reflects an emerging confusion regarding how trademarks are 
viewed, both internationally and domestically, and whether antibrands 
are constitutionally protected. How do we balance protection of 
trademark property with protection for freedom of speech? Many 
cases take approaches that are similar to the Plesner case: where a 
court might begin by awarding relief to the trademark owner, but then 
take the opposite holding on appeal, usually after global media 
attention ensues, and the appeals court has a chance to consider other 
approaches. 
Cases like Plesner’s, I would argue, illustrate yet another aspect of 
trademark cosmopolitanism, because they underscore the increasing 
globalization of brands as well as the jurisprudential frameworks that 
govern them. Here, I examine three separate cases — one involving 
parodic T-shirts from South Africa (the famous Laugh it Off case),135 
another case involving Greenpeace’s appropriation of a logo in France, 
and a third case involving an appropriated TATA company logo in 
India. My principal argument in this section is that just as we are 
seeing the emergence of a global branding movement, we are also 
seeing a global antibranding movement. However, national disparities 
regarding whether parody is a constitutionally protected freedom carry 
dramatic implications for the movement’s future, raising critical 
questions about the future of reconciling trademark cosmopolitanism 
with the freedom of political and artistic expression. 
1. Laughing It Off in South Africa 
The Laugh it Off case, which concerned the conflict over parody and 
property, is probably one of the most prominent antibranding cases 
outside of the United States. The plaintiff, South African Breweries, or 
SAB, is one of the leading beers in the country of South Africa, and a 
 
 134 Id.  
 135 See Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. African Breweries Int’l (Fin.) BV t/a Sabmark 
Int’l & Another 2005 (8) BCLR 743 (CC) at 39 para. 65 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Laugh It 
Off].  
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pervasive advertiser of its brand.136 The defendant, on the other hand, 
Laugh it Off, is a corporation that engages in the appropriation of 
brands for the purposes of humor and social commentary. According 
to its website, the company has two objectives: one, to create a close 
association with well-known brands, and two, to make fun of them.137 
This particular case is illustrative of how localized antibrand 
expression can often give rise to questions of international, 
constitutional importance. In that case, the defendant replaced SAB’s 
trademark, which said “Black Label,” with “Black Labour,” and the 
slogan, “America’s Lusty, Lively Beer — Brewed in South Africa,” was 
replaced with “Africa’s Lusty, Lively Exploitation Since 1652 — No 
Regard Given Worldwide.” After SAB sent several cease and desist 
letters in 2002 that went unanswered, it decided to commence 
litigation.138 At issue in the case was whether the mark had taken 
unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to the reputation of the Black 
Label mark.139 In its defense, the defendant argued that the plaintiff 
had not established a likelihood of detriment, and that even if such a 
likelihood had been established, the antibrand was protected by the 
South African Constitution’s protection for freedom of expression.140 
After having lost several times before the lower courts, Justin Nurse, 
the company founder of Laugh it Off, decided to appeal his case to the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the highest court, and won, in a 
surprising, landmark defense of freedom of expression over 
trademarks as property. For scholars, Laugh it Off represents an 
 
 136 Id. at 7. 
 137 Id. at 7-8. According to the company’s founder, Justin Nurse, a journalism 
graduate student, his work constitutes “ideological jujitsu,” whereupon brands are 
appropriated, but slightly modified, to send an alternative message. “The purpose,” 
the defendant explained, “is to lampoon the brands, to make a statement about the 
company’s policies or practices; to probe issues bearing on the broader society; to 
assert free expression and in doing so to challenge the inordinate use of trade mark 
laws to silence expressions that are unflattering about brands.” Id. at 9-10. 
 138 This was not the first time Nurse ran into trouble with trademark owners. 
Laugh it Off previously faced legal action initiated by Lego for a T-shirt design that 
used lego blocks with the word “Legover” underneath. Owners of the brand “Weet-
bix” had objected to another shirt that featured the logo, “Weed-brix,” Red Bull to a 
shirt that said “Dead Bull,” the soap brand Dettol to a shirt that said “Death Toll,” and 
the denim brand “Diesel for Successful Living” similarly expressed displeasure over a 
shirt that said “Denial for Successful Loafing.” Coca-Cola claimed trademark 
infringement over a shirt that said, “Corruption.” There were other brands that did 
not object, however, like Kentucky Fried Chicken, which was called “Unlucky Fried 
Chicken,” or Virgin, which became “Viagra.” See Rimmer, supra note 101, at 73-74.  
 139 See Thea Illsley, How to Tell a Take-Off from a Rip-Off: Trade Mark Parody and 
Freedom of Expression in South Africa: Notes and Comments, 22 SAJHR 119-20 (2006). 
 140 Id. at 120.  
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example of how anti-global activist movements have raised 
international, critical questions for scholars of both intellectual 
property and constitutional law.141 Yet the opinion, in and of itself, 
demonstrates a judicially-oriented cosmopolitanist masterpiece, 
demonstrating a significant array of global constitutional borrowing by 
the international range of the cases cited by the Court in reaching its 
decision.142 
Consider, at the outset, the question of the standard for trademark 
infringement, which drew heavily from foreign jurisdictions. The 
Court notes, for example, that its trademark provisions bear near-
complete identicality to similar protections from the European 
Directive and the United Kingdom.143 There was, however, one 
significant difference — whereas those statutes required proof of 
actual detriment or unfair advantage, South Africa required only a 
“likelihood” of unfair advantage or detriment.144 Significantly, despite 
this more relaxed standard, the Constitutional Court still decided to 
protect the antibrand, reversing the lower courts’ earlier opinions. Part 
of the reason for this outcome, of course, stemmed from the delicate 
balancing of constitutional freedoms with intellectual property. In 
South Africa, freedom of expression is constitutionally protected by 
 
 141 Australian scholar Matthew Rimmer writes, for example, of the need to 
contextualize the dispute over the Black Label mark “in the context of wider debates 
over trade mark law, culture jamming, and the No Logo anti-global capitalism 
movement.” Rimmer, supra note 101, at 86.  
 142 I have described this phenomenon elsewhere, as others have. See Sonia K. 
Katyal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1422 (2010) (collecting 
citations); see also Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: 
Lessons from South Africa, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 79, 92 (2010).  
 143 Section 10(3) the United Kingdom (UK) Trade Marks Act 1994, which was 
fashioned along the provisions of the first European Directive, provides that “A person 
infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign which - (a) is 
identical or similar to the trade mark, and (b) is used in relation to goods and services 
which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the trade 
mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being without 
cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or 
repute of the trade mark.” Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 10 (Eng.). 
 144 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 13 para. 21. According to the constitutional court, 
Article 5(2) of the European Directive and Section 10(3) of the 1994 United Kingdom 
Act are virtually identical, but require proof of actual detriment or unfair advantage; 
the South African section requires a likelihood of unfair advantage or detriment, 
stating “the use of the trademark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be 
detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trademark, 
notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.” Charles Webster, Laugh It Off 
Gets Last Laugh in Dilution Case, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (July 1, 2005), http:// 
www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/LaughItOffGetsLastLaughinDilutionCase.aspx.  
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Section 16 of the Constitution, which protects the right, along with 
the “freedom of artistic creativity” and “freedom to receive or impart 
information or ideas,” along with other forms of protection.145 
In the case of Laugh it Off, the Constitutional Court took the view 
that the right to hold intellectual property was not universally 
accepted as a fundamental right, but still informally treated it as such 
for the purposes of the opinion.146 The lower court, in contrast, had 
refused to consider a defense of freedom of expression for two 
principal reasons: first, because of the commercial purpose of the 
shirts; and second, because it found that the message went beyond 
parody and bordered, instead, on hate speech because of its invocation 
of race and inequality.147 On appeal before the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (“SCA”), Laugh it Off fared no better.148 Although the SCA 
noted that unlike fixed property, intellectual property enjoyed no 
special status under the Constitution, it chose to protect the property 
rights of SAB over the interests in freedom of expression.149 For the 
SCA, like the lower court, the expression on the shirt was found to 
create an association that was “particularly unwholesome, unsavoury, 
or degrading” because it constituted an “unfair” and “unjustified racial 
slur” on SAB.150 Under this view, Laugh it Off could have easily 
expressed an identical message about “black labour” and “white guilt” 
without appropriating the specific brand at issue. There was no parody 
here, SCA concluded, because Laugh it Off was not commenting on 
SAB, but merely employing SAB in service of its humor. In other 
 
 145 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 2 para. 2.  
 146 One scholar reported that the Laugh It Off judgment’s most promising aspect 
involved “its unequivocal recognition that the right to hold intellectual property is in 
effect a right, of equal status to the specified fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights 
such as freedom of speech and privacy.” Owen H. Dean, The Irresistible Force of 
Freedom of Speech Meets the Immovable Object: Trade Mark Law in South Africa, 1 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 614, 617, 619 (2006). 
 147 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 10 para. 15.  
 148 The plaintiff had merely asserted a likelihood of harm, by pointing out that the 
racial slur would build a racially insensitive association with the company, erode the 
exclusiveness of its mark, and discourage people from purchasing the beer. Yet 
because these harms were all largely speculative, and were not accompanied by added 
evidence or facts showing the probability of these events taking place, the 
Constitutional Court rejected them. “It is plain from the record that no evidence, 
direct or inferential, was adduced to establish likelihood of detriment either in the 
sense of unfavourable associations that have been created . . . or in the context of a 
likelihood of loss of sales by virtue of the reduced commercial magnetism of the 
mark.” See id. at 35-36 para. 58.  
 149 See Dean, supra note 146, at 616.  
 150 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 13 para. 21.  
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words, if the antibrand had not become an actual “brand,” in the sense 
of the shirts becoming a commodity in the court’s eyes, it might have 
remained protected had it remained entirely noncommercial.151 
In contrast, the Constitutional Court’s main holding concluded that 
SAB had failed to show proof of infringement, because there had been 
no showing of material harm.152 Citing the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., the court 
wrote that “in order to succeed, the owner of the mark bears the onus 
to demonstrate likelihood of substantial harm or detriment which, 
seen within the context of the case, amounts to unfairness.”153 The 
mere fact that the expressive act causes some discomfort or “appear[s] 
to be morally reprobate or unsavoury to others,” however, is irrelevant 
if the expression is otherwise protected, the Court wrote.154 
To the value of freedom of expression, the Court emphasized its 
primary value by referencing its own decisions on the matter, in 
addition to other jurisdictions — Canada and the United States in 
particular. It also referenced the protection for freedom of expression 
in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights as well as the 
European Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.155 Yet while other antibrand decisions directly relied on the 
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the South African 
Laugh it Off case interpreted the work “in light of” fundamental rights, 
which suggested at least some gentle reluctance to constitutionalizing 
 
 151 Consider the lower court’s formulation, drawing a line between protecting a 
fundamental right of freedom of expression, and using a mark in the course of trade:  
[Appellant] may not use [the mark] in relation to goods or services. The 
appellant may use in relation to goods or services by placing the caricature 
on T-shirts, flags or whatever provided it is not so used in the course of 
trade. The appellant may declaim the message about black labour and white 
guilt from rooftops, pulpits and political platforms; and it may place the 
same words (without appropriating the registered marks’ repute) on T-
shirts, and sell them.  
See Dario Tanziani, South Africa: Trade Marks, Infringement, Tarnishing of Marks, 
Defense of Freedom of Speech, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. N-4, N-8 (2005). Agreeing 
with this provision, another scholar echoed that trademark law “hardly affects the 
appellant’s freedom of expression. Freedom of expression does not entitle a party to 
damage private property such as painting graffiti on private or even public property. 
Why should it therefore be different simply because the property is a trade mark?” Id.  
 152 Illsley, supra note 139, at 120.  
 153 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 31 para. 50.  
 154 Rimmer, supra note 101, at 97 (quoting Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 34 para. 55). 
 155 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 27 para. 45.  
  
2014] Trademark Cosmopolitanism 917 
the right to antibrand.156 However, in a telling section, the Court cited 
Laugh it Off’s position, extensively: 
Brands, the applicant asserts, are often put to work by 
powerful corporations to crowd out equally legitimate 
expression. They tend to stifle the open and free flow of ideas. 
Brand building, the applicant asserts, sets out to occupy 
cultural space, social space, and even one’s own “headspace.” 
Since, in time, marketing brands graduate to cultural icons, 
they should not be beyond the reach of public disclaim or 
indeed applause. The purposes of copyright and trade mark 
laws in an open and democratic society is not to shut out 
critical expression or to throttle artistic and other expressive 
acts in a manner that gives way to inordinate brand sway.157 
Turning to the anti-dilution/infringement provisions within South 
African trademark law, the Court recognized a tension, noting that it 
“limits the right to free expression,” but decided to reach a conclusion 
that interpreted trademark principles in a way that ensured its 
compatibility with freedom of expression.158 “Courts must be astute 
not to convert the anti-dilution safeguard of renowned trade marks 
usually controlled by powerful financial interests into a monopoly 
adverse to other claims of expressive conduct of at least equal cogency 
and worth in our broader society,” the Court observed.159 
Finally, although the Court drew on the United States Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision on parody, Campbell v. Acuff,160 it drew 
back from the suggestion that parody was constitutionally protected, 
but then still wound up protecting it anyway. It was unnecessary, in 
the Court’s eyes, to consider the fairness of the parody because the 
plaintiff had failed to establish the likelihood of economic prejudice.161 
It must always be kept in mind that, unlike in the US, in our 
jurisprudence there are no enclaves of protected expression 
such as parody or satire and therefore the mere 
characterization of an expression as such would not be 
decisive of what is fair use under our anti-dilution protection 
of section 34(1)(c) because ordinarily all categories of 
 
 156 See Geiger, “Constitutionalising,” supra note 133, at 396. 
 157 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 49 para. 81.  
 158 Id. at 29-30 para. 48.  
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 39 para. 64. 
 161 See id. at 39-40 para. 66; see also Rimmer, supra note 101, at 99.  
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expression, save those excluded by the Constitution itself, 
enjoy constitutional shield and may be restricted only in a way 
constitutionally authorised, 
the Court concluded.162 In this manner, the Court carved out a 
broader area of protection for expression like parody, but did so by 
explaining that all speech is deserving of protection, not just parody 
specifically. 
In a heavily cited concurring opinion, Judge Sachs opened with the 
question, “Does the law have a sense of humour?,” noting that judicial 
views on parody are tremendously varied internationally. Although 
parody is not a separate defense in South Africa, Judge Sachs also 
wrote to underscore his finding that the commercial intent of Laugh it 
Off should not detract from its constitutional protection. Instead, for 
Judge Sachs, in a world where both artists and advertisers use cultural 
icons to comment on society, the line between commercial and 
noncommercial has disappeared.163 “In our consumerist society where 
branding occupies a prominent space in our public culture,” Sachs 
concludes, “one does not have to be a ‘cultural jammer’ to recognise 
that there is a legitimate place for criticism of a particular trademark, 
or of the influence of branding in general or of the overzealous use of 
trademark law to stifle public debate. In such circumstances the 
medium could well be the message, and the more the trademark itself 
is both directly the target and the instrument, the more justifiable will 
its parodic incorporation be.”164 
As a final matter, the Court also demanded that SAB pay for Nurse’s 
attorney’s fees, a significant win for Laugh it Off. In celebration of the 
decision, Laugh it Off auctioned off 1,000 t-shirts and donated the 
proceeds to an anti-alcohol abuse charity.165 
2. Protecting the Right to Critique: Greenpeace v. Esso 
In France, the trajectory of such antibranding cases has revealed a 
trend that resembles that of South Africa, demonstrating again the 
 
 162 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 39-40 para. 66.  
 163 See id. at 51 para. 84 (referencing Steven M. Cordero, Note, Cocaine-Cola, the 
Velvet Elvis, Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 
8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599 (1988)).  
 164 See id. at 52 para. 86. As a result of the decision, another company, Telkom, 
which had filed a defamation and copyright case against the creators of Helkom, a 
parody site protesting the company, dropped the case. See Rimmer, supra note 101, at 
103. 
 165 Rimmer, supra note 101, at 102. 
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global, dyadic pull of both branding and antibranding phenomena, 
and the tendency to borrow from other jurisdictions to resolve 
conflicts between them. 
Early cases, however, were not as friendly to the cause. Some French 
courts had held that antibrand uses of trademarks could be infringing, 
including the use of a trademark in an antismoking campaign (a pool 
of tar emerging from a Marlboro packet, for example) or even the use 
of a trademark in a newspaper headline.166 In another case, a lower 
French court also held that a website calling for a boycott of the 
Gervais Danone company was infringing.167 
Like South Africa, more modern cases have reversed the trend, to 
some extent, and reveal that most successful antibrand cases win on 
appeal, and usually after the court employs case law from other 
jurisdictions. For example, consider a case that involved an 
antismoking campaign that used a dying Camel from the famous 
cigarette maker producing smoke in the shape of a skull that also 
accompanied the slogan, “The fag is worse than crossing the 
desert . . . .”168 The French Supreme Court reversed a lower court 
ruling that found infringement and instead found that the humorous 
use of the mark served the goal to protect the public health of 
adolescents.169 
 
 166 Christophe Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression — The 
Proportionality of Criticism, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. 317, 319 (2007) [hereinafter 
Trade Marks]. In one such case involving humor, the Paris High Court ruled that a 
parody of the LACOSTE label crocodile that showed two fornicating crocodiles 
accompanied by the expression, “Attention, j’accoste” (“Beware, I’m accosting”) was 
infringing. In that case, the Court cast the expression as commercial and also 
concluded that “the right to parody or caricature could not apply in a field which is 
purely commercial.” See Jean-François Bretonnière & Cordélia Flourens, France: 
Trademark Rights v. Free Speech: Can Prejudicial Trademark Use Still Be Prevented?, in 7 
IP VALUE: BUILDING & ENFORCING INTELL. PROP. VALUE 136, 136-37 (2009), available at 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/Article.ashx?g=46a24ecb-1bcd-4c10-be35-
4854fdb8a9da (noting an initial trend towards holding defendants liable that has now 
shifted towards protection of freedom of expression). Both a satirical treatment of the 
trademark Pastis, and even a representation of a dying camel smoking a cigarette in an 
antismoking campaign were also the subject of a successful tarnishment claim at the 
lower court level. See Emmanuel Baud, The Damage Done, TRADEMARK WORLD, Apr. 
2005, at 29, 30.  
 167 See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 137 (discussing the case’s 
disposition).  
 168 Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 318.  
 169 See Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Marks and Human Rights, in 18 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 335, 350 (Paul Torremans ed., 2008) (citing Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct. 19, 2006, Bull. civ. 
II, No. 1601 (Fr.)). 
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Yet, like the South African case, it is important to note that in 
France, parody is not a complete defense against trademark 
infringement.170 Instead, it is simply one of a multiplicity of factors 
that courts consider in deciding whether to protect the expression 
through constitutional reasoning. The absence of clear protections for 
parody, as we see in the Plesner and Laugh it Off cases, have the effect 
of putting greater emphasis on other factors, like whether or not the 
activity is commercially oriented. The same is true here, where the 
absence of commercial intent can be a deciding factor in the 
defendant’s favor. 
In one particularly notable case, the company Esso decided to take 
legal action against Greenpeace’s French organization, whose Stop 
E$$O Campaign targeted the oil company for its environmental 
practices. Esso (otherwise known as ExxonMobil) had argued that 
Greenpeace’s use of the logo made it resemble the symbol of the Nazi 
SS, thereby confusing the public, and putting it within the realm of 
illegal hate speech associated with Nazi memorabilia.171 
However, a French high court, while noting that parody was not a 
complete defense, nevertheless decided to protect Greenpeace’s use of 
the mark “E$$O” because Greenpeace did not aim to promote its 
products commercially but instead only to express its political point of 
view.172 It reached this conclusion, however, even though there was 
evidence that the antibrands had been placed on t-shirts, and Esso 
argued that even Greenpeace’s call for an Esso boycott had a 
commercial impact.173 The court rejected the import of this evidence, 
 
 170 See Tanziani, supra note 151, at N−8.  
 171 Esso is ExxonMobil in France. See ExxonMobil Sues Over Logo ‘Abuse,’ BBC 
NEWS WORLD EDITION (June 25, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/ 
2064559.stm. Some part, it seems, of Esso’s allegations appeared tied to an earlier 
speech case that held Yahoo liable, in part, for the auction of Nazi memorabilia in 
France, which violates French law that prohibits the wearing or exhibition of Nazi 
memorabilia. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 379 
F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). Not only did Esso demand an end to the campaign, 
but also claimed almost $80,000 in daily compensation to the company due to the 
alleged cost of the infringement. “We find it ironic that the richest corporation in the 
world can’t recognise the dollar sign, and confuses it with a Nazi symbol,” claimed 
Greenpeace to the public. In response, Esso claimed that it was only trying to prevent 
Greenpeace’s use of the logo, not alter Greenpeace’s message or stop them from 
expressing themselves. See ExxonMobil Sues Over Logo ‘Abuse,’ supra.  
 172 See Tanziani, supra note 151, at N−8 to N−9 (discussing this case).  
 173 Esso Plc v. Greenpeace France, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 
Paris, 4e ch., Nov. 16, 2005, E.T.M.R. 2006, 53, 665, Carre-Pierrat (Fr.) [hereinafter 
Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53].  
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accusing Esso of displaying “the worst kind of bad faith” in suggesting 
that such activities would have a business import.174 
Instead, the court said that “the constitutional principle of the 
freedom of expression implies that the organization . . . can, on its 
internet site, criticize, in the form that it regards appropriate, the 
damage to the environment and the risk caused to public health by 
industrial activities . . . .”175 While characterizing the work as a parody, 
but also characterizing it as an expression of noncommercial speech, 
the court crafted out a special area of exception, it seems, for 
expression motivated specifically by political purposes and limited to 
the Internet. “[T]he defendant should be able to denounce attacks on 
the environment and the risks to human health caused by certain 
industrial activities, in whatever form it deemed best suited to the aim 
pursued. While this freedom is not absolute, it may only be subject to 
restrictions which are necessary to respect the rights of others,” the 
court wrote.176 
Although the case was a win for Greenpeace, it highlights a few 
areas of concern for trademark scholars. The first area of concern 
involves the reality that the French court implicitly suggests that 
parody cases, when they are not cast as parody, can still be vulnerable 
to a charge from a non-trademark claim, such as denigration, 
disparagement, or defamation. In such cases, plaintiffs often employ 
defamation or disparagement claims, in addition to the trademark 
causes of action, sometimes with varying success. Under French law, 
disparagement is described as “[a]ny act whatsoever which causes 
damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred to 
compensate it,” usually referring to conduct that aims to discredit or 
belittle the plaintiff.177 (Some French courts have described 
disparagement to involve “a polemical use alien to business life.”)178 
In this case, Esso had charged that Greenpeace had sought to 
denigrate and discredit Esso’s products and services. At the same time 
that Esso made these allegations, however, it also admitted that 
Greenpeace had not actually targeted or criticized any of its products 
or services, but only restricted its critique to its logo specifically and to 
discuss Esso’s role in climate change and its environmental 
 
 174 Id. at 666. 
 175 Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 321. 
 176 Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53, at 666. 
 177 Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 137 (quoting CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] 
art. 1382 (Fr.)). 
 178 Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 322.  
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practices.179 As a result, the court, in turn, rejected Esso’s allegations, 
noting, “[i]t is, at the very least, paradoxical to invoke acts of 
denigration — of which, incidentally, the exact nature is not stated . . . 
and to assert that the products and services of the appellant company 
were not subject to any criticism.”180 Given the content of 
Greenpeace’s website, the court concluded that denigration was 
completely unproven. 
However, despite the outcome of the case in the Esso judgment, it 
remains noteworthy that claims like denigration, disparagement, and 
defamation can still be employed successfully against activist groups, 
particularly at the lower court level. Lawyers have suggested that the 
use of humor, like other types of parody, is defensible and protectable, 
so long as the defendants do not use the trademark for a commercial 
purpose, and so long as the trademark use is “proportionate,” meaning 
that the use is not outrageous in nature.181 This reasoning was used to 
protect a website that named itself “SOS victims of Credit Agricole” on 
the grounds that the use was not outrageous in nature.182 But defining 
what is outrageous is clearly a matter that is deeply loaded with 
subjectivity. 
For example, in another case involving Greenpeace, this time 
targeting Areva, a Paris High Court held that the trademark had not 
been infringed but was disparaged, exceeding the protection of 
freedom of expression and holding Greenpeace liable.183 However, this 
opinion was reversed at the Court of Cassation, which held that the 
parody had to be read in conjunction with Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The court concluded that Greenpeace 
was acting in accordance with “the interest of the general public and 
 
 179 Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53, at 671.  
 180 Id. 
 181 See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 138. 
 182 Id. The Supreme Court also reached a similar conclusion involving a use of a 
puppet in a television show, which represented the president of the Peugeot car brand 
who was disparaging products of the company. In that case, the Supreme Court 
reversed lower court rulings that found that the outrageous nature of the speech 
caused damage to the company. Id.  
 183 See Baud, supra note 166, at 31. In that case, the “A” of the company had been 
modified with a skull-like shadow, and the body of a dead fish with the statement, 
“Stop Plutonium — the Stopping is Obvious.” Here the court found that other means 
to communicate the same message could have been used — “the equation 
AREVA=DEATH proceeds from a purely disparaging reasoning for which their 
authors should be liable,” it concluded. There was a risk that consumers would 
believe that all of Areva’s products were harmful, the court explained, and enjoined 
the expression as a result. Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 322 (quoting case).  
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public health, and using proportionate means in so doing, and had 
therefore not misused their right to freedom of expression.”184 
Nevertheless, while most of these cases do eventually come out in 
favor of the defendants, it is worth noting that disparagement can still 
be at issue if the defendant targets specific products or services.185 And 
it is also worth noting the added role that defamation may play in such 
cases.186 This cause of action has been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to not include criticism of products or services, suggesting that 
it can apply as an alternative in cases where disparagement does not 
apply and a company (rather than its specific products or services) is 
targeted instead.187 The availability has led some to suggest that it may 
be a fruitful alternative for plaintiff corporations to pursue to curb 
antibranding expression. 
3. Gaming the Antibrand: TATA and the Turtles 
Antibranding is also alive in India, whereupon Greenpeace has also 
faced one of its own court cases involving the creation of an online 
game called Turtles v. TATA, in which the goal of the game, modeled 
after Pac Man, is to help yellow turtles eat as many little white dots as 
possible, without running into “Ratty” who appears to be modeled 
after Ratan Tata, chair of the powerful multinational Tata Corporation. 
The game is designed so that TATA is the antagonist, and the turtle 
has to, literally, strategically destroy the TATA logo.188 The purpose of 
the game was to draw attention to the potential environmental impact 
of a proposed TATA dam, known as the Dhamra Project, and the risk 
 
 184 France: Greenpeace France et al. v. Areva, ARTICLE 19 (Feb. 7, 2008), http:// 
www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3186/en/france:-greenpeace-france-et-al.-v.-
areva#sthash.s6ndx7L9.dpuf.  
 185 For example, in a case involving the boycott of Danone’s website, the 
expression was protected because the website did not offer products or services, nor 
did it target Danone’s products and services specifically. This case, and others, 
suggests that targeting products or services, or offering alternative products or 
services, might risk liability. See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 138.  
 186 The 1881 law of defamation charges that defamation occurs “where an 
allegation or an assessment of a precise fact is made targeting a specific person so as to 
harm his or her honour or reputation.” Id. at 139.  
 187 Id.  
 188 “The aim of the colourful and noisy game is to help the yellow turtles to eat as 
many of the white dots [jellyfish and other sea creatures] . . . while dodging the TATA 
demons if you eat a power pill, you will be gifted with super-turtle powers to vanquish 
the demons of development that are threatening your coastal home.” Tata Sons Ltd. v. 
Greenpeace Int’l & ANR, (2010) 9089 I.A. 1, ¶¶ 7, 26 (Delhi H.C., 2011) (India) 
[hereinafter Tata Sons, (2010) 9089 I.A.], available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/ 
562656/. Others to avoid are “matty,” “Natty,” or “Tinku.” Id.  
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of affecting a turtle habitat, the Olive Ridley Sea Turtle nesting 
beaches, among other environmental concerns.189 
As I suggested in the previous section, trademark claims often 
appear alongside other, speech-related claims like defamation and 
disparagement. Here, Tata sued for defamation and trademark 
infringement, arguing, in a colorful filing before the court, that 
“portraying [Tata] as a demon in the game with pointed use of the ‘T’ 
device is malicious, as it is intended to convey to the world at large the 
so called heartlessness in setting up the Dhamra Project.”190 For 
support, Tata argued that “‘use’ of trademark is not confined merely to 
the defendant engaging itself in a trade or commercial activity, but 
other forms of speech or representation, which would tarnish the 
plaintiff’s mark,” citing the 1972 Gemini Rising case (the case 
involving a poster that said “Enjoy Cocaine”) and a Louis Vuitton case 
from 2007 involving Haute Diggity Dog, a pet toy manufacturer. 
Greenpeace, as well, used its own form of comparative law — it 
argued that Tata’s actions demonstrated a form of a “strategic lawsuit 
against public participation” otherwise known as a SLAPP suit, that 
was intended to censor and intimidate those who are concerned with 
the environmental impact of the project.191 Greenpeace argued that its 
 
 189 Id. ¶¶ 17-19. 
 190 “Had the intention of the defendant really been to express dissent, and if indeed 
they wanted to speak in hyperboles there was other legitimate means of doing so,” the 
filing stated. Id. ¶ 11.  
 191 For more on SLAPP suits, see, for example, Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits 
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) Address, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 39 (1989) 
(noting that SLAPP lawsuits are harmful to activists regardless of whether the plaintiff 
wins or loses); Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New 
Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105 (1988) (suggesting reform to prevent potential 
users of intimidation tactics from employing them); Penelope Canan & George W. 
Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for 
Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 955 (1992) (illustrating 
statistically the success of SLAPP plaintiffs); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, 
Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and 
Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385 (1988) (using qualitative and 
quantitative data to measure the impact the SLAPP experience on subsequent political 
participation); Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse 
of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417 (1991) 
(finding that enthusiasm for the SLAPPback strategy must be tempered by a 
recognition of its risks); Sharlene A. McEvoy, “The Big Chill”: Business Use of the Tort 
of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 503 (1990) (arguing that there must be a balance between the right to bring an 
action for defamation, and the right to exercise one’s first amendment rights); Jawn 
Ardin Sandifer & George Bundy Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New Threat to 
Civil Rights Organizations, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 559 (1975) (finding that private causes of 
action are a threat to boycotts led by civil rights organizations); Victor J. Cosentino, 
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work was entirely noncommercial, and that Indian trademark law, 
specifically section 29(4) of the Indian Trademarks Act of 1999 
demonstrates that the use of a trademark for the purposes of criticism, 
fair comment, or parody does not amount to infringement.192 It 
alleged, similarly, that its use was not in the course of trade and 
therefore could not satisfy the requirements for dilution.193 
News reports initially suggested that the Delhi High Court advised 
Greenpeace to remove the TATA logo from its game (noting that one 
Judge was said to have stated to Greenpeace “[w]e are not directing 
you to stop using the game but you can consider not using the 
logo”).194 However, in its written opinion, the Court advocated a 
strong defense of free speech, citing both the Esso case and the Laugh 
it Off case.195 What is especially interesting about the case is that it 
focuses not just on trademark infringement, and also dilution, but on 
defamation, switching between these concerns throughout the 
opinion. It dismisses Greenpeace’s use of the term “demons” in 
conjunction with the TATA logo as “mere hyperbole,” noting that 
Greenpeace argued that the game “succinctly and creatively enables 
the registering of protest . . .” and thus must be viewed as part and 
parcel of criticism and commentary.196 
In the TATA case, the Court quotes extensively from a series of 
British opinions that suggested reluctance in granting preliminary 
injunctions due to the speech issues involved.197 The Delhi High Court 
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also questioned whether the role of the Internet called for a more 
relaxed standard, given the ease and speed of communication. It also 
continued to rely on American jurisprudence in finding the absence of 
actual malice, noting that there was no evidence, here, of a reckless 
disregard for the truth, and the Internet context did not change its 
outcome. Instead, here, the Court noted that the issue involved a 
project with a tremendous degree of environmental concern and a 
wide diversity of opinions.198 
Finally, the Court also rejected the trademark infringement and 
dilution claims. Given the absence of a profit motive on behalf of 
Greenpeace, and the Court’s recognition of the right of defendants to 
“comment, ridicule and parody” the registered trademarks, the Court 
refused to grant an injunction.199 In its closing paragraphs, the Court 
drew heavily and admiringly from the Laugh it Off opinion, citing 
Judge Sachs’ observation that the Court’s focus on the detriment 
requirement tended to obscure a larger, and deeper focus on the value 
of parody, thus allowing a focus on property to overshadow a more 
substantial focus on the value and freedom of expression.200 
The Delhi High Court also noted that at times, a parody can actually 
enhance the distinctiveness of a famous mark by making it into an 
icon.201 Citing the Esso case, the Court concluded: “[T]he use of a 
trademark, as the object of a critical comment, or event attack, does 
not necessarily result in infringement . . . . If the user’s intention is to 
focus on some activity of the trademark owner, and is ‘denominative,’ 
drawing attention of the reader or viewer to the activity,” it may not be 
subject to injunctive relief.202 
In a particularly memorable set of observations, the Court wrote, 
that it “cannot anoint itself as a literary critic, to judge the efficacy of 
use of such medium, nor can it don the robes of a censor. It merely 
patrols the boundaries of free speech, and in exceptional cases, issues 
injunctions . . . .”203 It continued, “granting an injunction would freeze 
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the entire public debate on the effect of the port project on the Olive 
Ridley turtles habitat. That, plainly would not be in public interest; it 
would most certainly be contrary to established principles.” The Court 
recalled the words of Walter Lippman: “The theory of the free press is 
not that the truth will be presented completely or perfectly in any one 
instance, but that the truth will emerge from free discussion.”204 
C. Three Key Themes: Fundamental Rights, Commodity and 
Commerciality 
All of the major cases discussed thus far have all reached 
conclusions that are strongly protective of the antibrand, but with very 
different rationales. Plesner’s case, for example, relied almost 
exclusively on human rights reasoning, whereas the Laugh it Off case 
was resolved on trademark grounds (and a finding of an absence of 
actual damages). On the other hand, both the Esso and TATA cases 
were resolved on the grounds that the uses were noncommercial and 
therefore fell out of the realm of trademark law. Whatever the result, 
each case, I think suggests some areas that are ripe for further 
consideration, particularly given the global nature of each dispute. 
Consider three main areas of tension, illustrated by the cases 
discussed above. The first major theme involves the fundamental 
question of which right matters more: the right to freedom of speech, 
and relatedly, the right to parody, or the right to intellectual property. 
Underlying this question, I would suggest, is an architectural question 
about how to situate the protection of intellectual property alongside 
the creation and protection of other fundamental rights.205 Is 
intellectual property a fundamental right, akin to other fundamental 
rights, or should it be treated as secondary to these other rights? And 
if intellectual property is considered to be a fundamental right, then 
how does that right square with that of the right to freedom of speech? 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states in 
Article 17 section 2 that “Intellectual property shall be protected,” and 
further that it “stands as an end in itself.”206 However, if the world is 
moving towards a more unitary regime for trademark registrations, it 
becomes necessary to confront the diversity of speech protections 
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within other nation states. Some countries, like the United States, 
expressly protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, and 
other commonwealth countries, like the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Australia, do not have a constitutional right to freedom 
of speech, but recognize its existence in statutes or common law.207 
Robert Burrell and Dev Gangjee have pointed out that the concept of 
freedom of expression in the United States, with its attendant 
suspicion of government, may make transplanting its legal principles 
quite difficult in jurisdictions which have different approaches to 
freedom of speech.208 Speech is much more protected in the United 
States than in other jurisdictions like Germany, France, and South 
Africa, which explains in part why the commercial or noncommercial 
nature of the speech became so significant. There is also some 
suggestion that commercial courts are ill-equipped to address 
constitutional matters, given the complexity of constitutional matters 
and the difficulty of transplanting legal concepts. There is also another 
excellent point raised by Gangjee and Burrell: a debate about 
constitutional rights, framed by a conflict between property and 
speech, just gets us nowhere because there is no “trumping” quality of 
either one.209 
Then there is also the question of how to employ human rights 
principles in such disputes. Recall that the case involving Plesner, for 
example, and also others discussed, to a lesser extent, were resolved 
not on trademark grounds — but on human rights principles. In 
Germany, too, in one case, the defendant altered the Marlboro 
trademark to deliver a nonsmoking message; the court cited the basic 
human right of freedom of expression in protecting the work.210 This 
factor suggests yet another layer of complexity to trademark 
cosmopolitanism, because characterizing intellectual property as a 
fundamental right does not necessarily garner its primacy against 
other rights, like freedom of expression worldwide. Some have argued 
that human rights law operates as a “corrective” when intellectual 
property rights might be used “excessively” or “contrary to their 
functions” — and that these protections operate when other “safety 
valves” in intellectual property have failed, such as fair use, fair 
dealing, and other exceptions and limitations.211 But, at the same time, 
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there is growing evidence that the protection of intellectual property, 
itself, is now viewed as a human right — in one case before the 
European Court of Human Rights, involving the mark “Budweiser,” 
the Court decided to classify trademarks as a type of “property right” 
for the purpose of human rights analysis.212 As a result, it makes it 
difficult to see how relying on fundamental rights analysis assists in 
resolving tough cases. 
Some scholars have argued, on this point, that thinking about 
intellectual property as a fundamental right ensures that it receives an 
important place in the relevant national constitution, ensuring that it 
ranks highly in any rights hierarchy. It also makes further justification 
of intellectual property unnecessary since it is viewed as a 
fundamental right. Finally, as Christopher Geiger has suggested, if 
intellectual property is considered to be a fundamental right, it 
becomes linked to “ethical values,” which are often considered to 
enjoy “widespread consent and acknowledgment under international 
law.”213 
Yet classifying intellectual property as a fundamental right gives us 
very little insight as to how to balance such a right against other 
fundamental rights, like freedom of speech.214 Particularly in countries 
where there is no fundamental right to freedom of speech, the very act 
of classifying intellectual property in this manner raises the risk of 
further alienating speech interests in favor of the primacy of 
intellectual property.215 Further, as Lawrence Helfer has explained, if 
intellectual property owners choose to invoke human rights law in 
order to garner additional protections, they would be likely to face stiff 
resistance from users and consumers, who would, in turn draw upon 
other fundamental rights in order to articulate a competing vision that 
focuses on the need to restrict, rather than expand, intellectual 
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property rights in order to protect fundamental freedoms.216 So, for 
example, national courts in Europe have been using the right to 
freedom of expression, protected by the European Convention, 
towards this end, particularly in the area of copyright to protect the 
creation of exceptions to the law.217 
Another main theme involves the question of whether these disputes 
concerning antibranding are best explored through the lens of the 
classic division between speech and property, or whether it makes 
sense to turn to other areas of law, such as the internal architecture of 
trademark law, to resolve these disputes.218 And, as a related matter, 
how much should claims like defamation and disparagement be 
employed as part of the dispute? Is there a benefit to not looking 
solely to fundamental rights to address parody, but instead by crafting 
exceptions within trademark law instead? Does only allowing a 
defendant recourse to fundamental rights to speech allow the property 
right of trademarks to grow even further, without having internal 
safety valves in its architecture? 
Part of this question, of course, addresses the context of the 
protection of parody in other jurisdictions. Constitutionalizing the 
right to antibrand, for example, might actually suggest that the right is 
comparable to that of an intellectual property right — which is 
interesting, given that in the United States fair use is not considered to 
be a constitutional right, but rather seems to be characterized as a 
privilege.219 The more a jurisdiction protects parody and freedom of 
speech, or the more uncertain of the outcome, one might argue, the 
more likely it will be that a plaintiff will seek to bring in other areas of 
law to restrict the defendant’s speech, like defamation and 
disparagement, or moral rights, to defend its intellectual property. As a 
result, other areas of law become employed in the service of trademark 
law, reflecting areas that trademark law has really failed to 
conclusively address. For example, in the United Kingdom, the author 
of a parodied work can also bring an action for derogatory treatment 
— that it distorted or mutilated the work, or that it was prejudicial to 
the intellectual property owner’s honor or reputation.220 
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Even in the United Kingdom, where there are no specific mentions 
of the right to parody within the statutory language, scholars have 
argued that the trademark statute (which protects marks against unfair 
advantage or detriment “without due cause”) suggests some possibility 
that the term “due cause” might provide some support for parody.221 
Others have suggested the use of the “fair dealing” exception to 
protect parody in the copyright context.222 (The same is also true in 
South Africa, where fair dealing is used instead of “fair use.”)223 And 
still other cases have protected parody on the grounds that the 
plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion.224 
In the context of antibranding, it may not always be necessary to 
carve out specific protections for parody if there are other means of 
protection available. Often, these other means can come from other 
constitutional principles, or even other parts of the trademark 
architecture of that jurisdiction. In a German case, for example, the 
country’s Supreme Court defended a postcard publisher that produced 
a satirical image that alluded to the trademark MILKA (a chocolate 
company), and also employed the distinctive lilac color in its 
artwork.225 Yet although the Court classified the use as a trademark 
use, and also noted that the use of the lilac color did evoke MILKA’s 
reputation, it opted to protect the use — not under freedom of 
expression or human rights principles per se — but under what has 
been described as a “constitutional right of freedom of the arts,” a 
specific version of the right to freedom of expression.226 Here, even 
though it recognized that the defendant was referencing the plaintiff’s 
reputation, it chose to honor the principle of artistic freedom over 
intellectual property rights, noting 
if the postcard (the media of the parody) does not debase the 
claimant’s trade mark and if it is not proved that the defendant 
acted exclusively for a commercial purpose, the protection of 
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artistic freedom has to prevail in the present litigation over the 
protection of property rights of Article 14(1) of the German 
Basic Law.227 
An additional area of dispute, stemming from this last point, 
involves the question of whether the antibrand should be treated 
differently than a brand. Often antibrands can be sold, as well as 
circulated, raising questions of what to do when there are expressive 
as well as commercial interests present. Not dissimilarly to the United 
States, it appears that parody is protected so long as it does not 
conflict with the commercial interests of the plaintiff — so long as the 
mark is being used for critique or parody.228 Of course, there are costs 
with an approach that focuses solely on trademark use, since it is not 
always entirely clear what a use “in the course of trade” can 
comprise.229 Yet scholars have expressed fear that the line between 
commercial and noncommercial expression (parody and the like) 
becomes extraordinarily blurred, given the expansion of trademark 
rights as property rights, a risk that only becomes exacerbated by 
recent rulings by the European Court of Justice.230 
But there are also a number of cases that involve, like the South 
African case above, the sale of goods that represent parodies or 
antibrands. Here, despite the South African outcome, the case law is 
decidedly more mixed internationally, especially in the United States, 
where case law has lined up on either side. The same is true 
internationally, where the case law is also split. For example, despite 
the Laugh it Off outcome, a German court had issued an injunction 
against the sale of shirts that had the Shell logo with a skull, finding 
that the use was commercial and therefore fell within the Unfair 
Competition Act.231 At times in trademark-related cases, courts have 
even attributed commercial motivations to media that has traditionally 
received the highest level of constitutional protections — like 
newspapers and other forms of editorial media. In one such case from 
the United Kingdom, a court even interpreted “use in the course of 
trade” to include a magazine’s use of the logo of Philips Company that 
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substituted the logo’s stars with Nazi swastikas to draw attention to a 
story it was publishing on the company’s activities during the Second 
World War.232 The use was considered to be commercial in the sense 
that it was intended to increase sales of the magazine, but the risks to 
the concept of freedom of expression were obvious. 
There are, however, a number of options to address the absence of 
clear protections for parody. States can easily specifically exempt 
noncommercial expression and political speech, and interpret parody 
as falling within these parameters.233 Or states can choose to refrain 
from enacting strong dilution laws.234 Still another option is for courts 
in member states to decline to award injunctive relief, as we saw in the 
Tata case, opting instead to focus on damages in order to preserve the 
interest in freedom of speech, or require the use of disclaimers to 
obviate confusion.235 A final option, also stemming from Tata, could 
be for member states to enact SLAPP-like statutes, or fee-shifting 
provisions that would force overly aggressive trademark owners to 
reconsider filing suit in non-meritorious cases. 
A final suggestion could be a broad one. Member states could amend 
the Paris Convention or TRIPS to state a direct commitment to 
“freedom of expression” when implementing their trademark 
protections. Although the obligation to protect freedom of expression 
is already part of the international treaty world, and certainly relevant 
to the interpretation of treaty terms, a more specific declaration for 
freedom of speech might be vital to ensuring a greater balance.236 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have suggested a link between contemporary 
accounts of cosmopolitanism and the growing case law on both global 
branding and antibranding. As I have suggested, the world of global 
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trademarks can be characterized in terms of a major shift from 
national to global branding strategies. 
Many cosmopolitanist ideals, I have suggested, have taken root in a 
variety of different political, economic, and social contexts, including 
intellectual property regulation and the international trademark 
system. In the trademark context, I would argue each of these areas 
have a variety of different facets, some that are more culturally 
oriented, and focused on the emergence of global brands and an 
accompanying transnational culture of consumption; and others more 
doctrinally or institutionally oriented that center on designing a legal 
architecture that focuses towards harmonization. 
At the same time, trademark lawyers often extol the virtues of 
harmonization and globalization without grappling with its complex 
dynamics as applied to the localized interpretation and expression of 
intellectual property protections. We see this particularly in the 
growing set of case law regarding the conflicts between the 
transnational brand, activist movements, and freedom of speech. As I 
have suggested, the dyadic relationship between the global branding 
— and antibranding movements — has exposed both the idealism and 
the fragility of cosmopolitanist ideals, offering us significant 
challenges for the future. 
